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vABSTRACT
ARE “REMEMBER” AND “KNOW” THE SAME PROCESS?
—A PERSPECTIVE FROM REACTION TIME DATA
SEMPTEMBER 2007
MIN ZENG, B.E., UNIVERSITY OF ELECTRONIC SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY OF
CHINA
M.E., UNIVERSITY OF ELECTRONIC SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Caren Rotello
The remember-know paradigm is widely used in recognition memory research
to explore the mechanisms underlying recognition judgments. The most intriguing
question about the paradigm that needs to be answered is: Are the processes that underlie
“remember” and “know” responses the same or different? The extant remember-know
models provide different answers. The dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994) assumes
that “remember” and “know” judgments are made with qualitatively different underlying
processes. The one-dimensional Signal Detection Theory (SDT) model (Donaldson, 1996;
Hirshman & Master, 1997) and the Sum-difference Theory of Remembering and
Knowing (STREAK) model assume that “remember” and “know” judgments are made
with same underlying processes but different response criteria. In this thesis, three
experiments were conducted to evaluate these models. The remember-know models were
fit to the accuracy data to see which model provides the best account for the ROC data. In
vi
addition, the reaction time data were fit with ex-Gaussian distributions and the best-fit
skew parameters were used to reveal whether the underlying strategic processes for
“remember” and “know” judgments are same or not.
The results of the remember-know model fit were mixed: In the first experiment
with list length manipulation, 6 out of 8 cases were best fit with the one-dimensional
models and the other 2 cases were best fit with the dual-process models; in the second
experiment with list strength manipulation, 11 out of 18 cases were best fit with the one-
dimensional models, another 6 cases were best fit with the dual-process models and the
rest one case were best fit with the STREAK model; in the third experiment with
response bias manipulation, 6 out of 16 cases were best fit with the one-dimensional
models and the other 10 cases were best fit with the dual-process models.
The results of ex-Gaussian fit to RT data supported the one-dimensional model
better: for the subjects who provide enough overlapping data in comparison of the
distributions of hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments, the values of skew
parameter did not differ for “remember” and “know” responses in 7 out of 8 cases. This
indicates that the same process underlies “remember” and “know” responses.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
You have probably had an experience like this one: You meet a man and feel that
his face looks so familiar that you are sure that you have met him before, but
unfortunately you just cannot recall who he is or when or where you met him before.
Cautiously, you greet each other. You turn around, keeping recalling. Then suddenly, it
occurs to you that you met him in a symposium and he is a friend of your colleague. The
implication of such experiences is that recognizing a person or an event can consist of the
assessment of familiarity and the recollection of the specific episode during which the
person or the event was encountered previously.
To investigate the subjective experience accompanying retrieval in recall and
recognition tasks, Tulving (1985) proposed the remember-know paradigm. During a
typical remember-know experiment, subjects are presented with a list of words or
pictures for study. Later, the test list includes studied items (targets) mixed with
unstudied items (lures). The subjects are asked to respond “old” for the items they think
they have already studied and “new” for the items they think were not in the study list.
Further, the subjects make “remember” or “know” responses for those they consider to
have been studied. “Know” means that the subject feels that the test item looks familiar,
and is sure that this word was studied, but does not recollect specific details. In contrast,
“remember” means that the subject can recall some details of the actual occurrence of the
item in the study list (Rajaram, 1993).
The remember-know paradigm allows subjects to report the subjective basis of
their recognition judgment, thus it provides a possible window onto their memory
2retrieval processes. The question in focus in remember-know research is the underlying
basis of “remember” and “know” responses.
1.1 General findings from behavioral experiments
Previous research has found that “remember” and “know” responses can be
dissociated under many circumstances, which has been taken as evidence that they are
functionally independent (See Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000 for a review). The
manipulations in these experiments have included impoverished versus elaborated
encoding such as divided versus full attention, shallow versus deep level of processing
and reading versus generating (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner et al, 1996). Such manipulations
influence the proportion of “remember” responses but do not affect the “know” response
rate. In contrast, manipulations of perceptual fluency affect “know” but not “remember”
responses (Rajaram, 1993). Nonword versus word presentation and massed versus spaced
repetition of study list items increase “know” responses and decrease “remember”
responses (Gardiner & Java, 1990; Parkin & Russo, 1993). Other manipulations, such as
long versus short response deadlines have been shown to cause parallel changes on
“remember” and “know” responses (Gardiner et al, 1998).
“Remember” and “know” have also been dissociated by varying the ages of the
participants. For older adults, “remember” responses are reduced compared with young
subjects, whereas “know” response rates are similar (Perfect et al., 1995). Patients with
amnesia, Alzheimer’s disease, or schizophrenia also make fewer “remember” responses
than control subjects, but their “know” response rates are similar (Dalla Barba, 1993,
1997; Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Schacter et al., 1997; Huron et al., 1995).
3Such functional dissociations have been thought to reflect the independence of
“remember” and “know” processes (Kelley & Jacoby, 1998; Reder et al., 2000;
Yonelinas, 2001; Murdock, 2006). However, a single process can also account for such
dissociations (Dunn & Kirsner, 1988; Dunn & Kirsner, 2003). Recent research shows that,
without a model, it is hard to decide whether such dissociations are due to sensitivity
change, as is generally assumed, or due to response bias, so that dissociation effects are
difficult to interpret (Rotello et al., 2006).
1.2 Brain imaging research on remember-know
Like most of the behavioral research, the research conducted with brain imaging
technologies generally assumes that “remember” responses tap recollection and “know”
responses tap familiarity. This is also the claim of the dual-process model (Yonelinas,
Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King, 1996), as will be described later. Using this
dual-process interpretation, event-related potential (ERP) components have been found
that correspond to familiarity and recollection respectively (Allan, Wilding, & Rugg,
1998; Curran, 2000; Curran, 2003; see Wixted, 2007 for alternative interpretation). Two
components are related to recollection: A left parietal component with post-stimulus
onset of 400ms lasting around 400-600ms, and a right frontal sustained positive
component with the same onset of 400ms lasting for about 1.5s. The former component is
thought to be a correlate of the successful retrieval of episodic information and the latter
is hypothesized to generate or maintain a representation of the study episode. In contrast,
the familiarity process is associated with a frontal negativity old/new effect (FN400 with
post-stimulus onset of 300ms lasting about 200ms, Curran, 2000).
4In ERP studies, the conclusion that recollection and familiarity are differentiated
in latency and brain topography is quite common. However, that interpretation is rooted
in the dual-process model on the strong assumption that recollection alone contributes to
“remember” responses and familiarity alone contributes to “know” responses. If the dual-
process model is incorrect (Wixted, 2007), the interpretation of these data is less clear.
While ERPs are useful for their excellent temporal resolution, fMRI is used for its
excellent spatial resolution to localize the underlying neural substrates of different mental
processes. The general findings of fMRI studies led to two points of view: One is that
“remember” and “know” responses dissociate in the loci of neural responses (Henson,
Rugg, Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005); the
other is that “remember” and “know” associate with the same processes but that
“remember” additionally recruits regions specific to retrieved content (Wheeler &
Buckner, 2004).
In the study done by Wheeler and Buckner (2004), the subjects studied a list of
words with half of the words followed by pictures (each picture was uniquely related to
its preceding word), and the other half followed by sounds (each sound was uniquely
related to its preceding word). Later these words were tested mixed with new words. The
authors found that both remembering and knowing associated with enhanced responses in
regions that are activated by “old” judgments relative to “new” judgments, and
remembering is additionally associated with the same regions that were activated by the
sensory specific (visual or auditory) information during study phase. These findings are
consistent with the viewpoint assuming the relationship between “know” and
“remember” responses is one of redundancy: “know” processes are also active during
5remembering (Knowlton, 1998). This is in contrast with the independence of
“remember” and “know” processes in the dual-process model.
Though a lot of ERP and fMRI studies have been done to investigate the time
course and underlying neural substrates of “remember” and “know” responses, the results
are mainly interpreted with the framework of the dual-process model. If the credibility of
the dual-process model is in question, these conclusions are also suspicious.
Neuroimaging studies could be useful for investigating processes that underlie
“remember” and “know” judgments if the researchers examine different accounts of the
remember-know paradigm rather than adopting a single framework to interpret results.
1.3 Remember-know models
A different approach to explicate the process or processes that underlie
“remember” and “know” judgments is mathematical modeling. There are three extant
models, each with different underlying assumptions about what “remember” and “know”
mean: the dual-process model (Yonelinas et al., 1994; Reder et al., 2000; Murdock,
2006), the one dimensional Signal Detection Theory (SDT) model (Donaldson, 1996;
Hirshman & Master) and a two-dimensional SDT model, STREAK (Sum-Difference
Theory of Remembering and Knowing, Rotello, Macmillan & Reeder, 2004).
In the dual-process theory (Yonelinas et al., 1994; Reder et al., 2000; Murdock,
2006), recognition judgments are based on either recollection or a familiarity process.
Yonelinas (1994, 1996, 2001) assumes that recollection is an all-or-none, high-threshold
process while familiarity works according to an equal variance signal detection model. If
the test words evoke recollection, subjects respond “remember” and if the test words
provoke feelings of familiarity, they respond “know”. Therefore, “remember” judgments
6are direct measures of recollection and “know” judgments are based on familiarity. Dual-
process models are essentially quantitative versions of the naïve process-pure view
described earlier. In contrast to Yonelinas’ dual-process model, the Sources of Activation
Confusion (SAC) model of Reder et al. (2000) and Murdock’s extension of TODAM
(2006) both assume that recollection and familiarity work according to an equal-variance
signal detection model. In the studies presented in this thesis, Yonelinas’ dual-process
model (1994) is of particular interest because it has dominated behavioral and
neuroscience research on recognition memory.
In the one-dimensional signal detection model, all recognition decisions are based
on the familiarity or global memory strength of the test item (Donaldson, 1996). Studied
items generally have higher memory strengths than the lures, though the distributions
overlap as is shown in Figure 1. To make a recognition decision, the participant
establishes a criterion of memory strength, calling all items with strength greater than that
criterion “old” and all weaker items “new”. To respond “remember” or “know”, the
subject establishes a higher criterion along the strength axis and responds “remember”
when the strength of the test word exceeds that higher criterion and “know” otherwise.
To reconcile this single dimension with the dual-process account, a variant of this SDT
model was proposed by Wixted and Stretch (2004) in which the strength axis is the sum
of recollection and familiarity instead of familiarity alone.
Wixted and Stretch (2004) noted that the average confidence ratings for
“remember” false alarms are generally higher than for “know” false alarms and even than
for “know” hits. This finding is nicely consistent with the one-dimensional model
because the set of items that elicit “remember” responses are further away from the old-
7new decision criterion than those that elicit “know” responses and thus receive higher
confidence ratings. This result is more problematic for Yonelinas’ dual-process model
because Yonelinas’ version assumes that “remember” is based on an all-or-none
recollection process and “remember” false alarms are dismissed as guesses, and guesses
are unlikely to be of high confidence. In addition, subjects often report “remember”
responses at several levels of confidence (Rotello et al., 2004; Rotello et al., 2006).
More evidence favoring the one-dimensional model over the dual-process model
comes from a study done with one-stage (the subjects are asked to make remember-
know-new responses for each test word) and two-stage (the subjects first make old-new
response for each test word and then make remember-know judgment for each word that
receives “old” response) recognition judgments. Hicks and Marsh (1999) showed that
these tasks yielded different results. The sensitivity of the one-stage procedure was
similar to that of the two-stage procedure, whereas the response bias for the one-stage
procedure was more liberal. Yonelinas’ dual-process model cannot account for response
bias in the “remember” decisions: This model assumes that “remember” responses tap on
recollection, and recollection is a high-threshold process which cannot lead to memory-
based false alarms (Rotello et al., 2006). In contrast, response bias can be explained
easily by signal detection models: While the distance of the means of the distributions of
old and new items remains the same, the response criteria shift with bias manipulation
along the memory strength axis. Further, the quantitative fits of the models show that the
signal detection model provides the best overall description of the data with manipulation
of response bias (Rotello et al., 2006).
8However, there is one challenge for the one-dimensional signal-detection model
(Rotello et al., 2004). The ratio of the standard deviations of the New and Old item
distributions can be estimated from the slope of zROC derived from confidence ratings.
Equivalently, it can be estimated from the two-point zROC that results from treating the
“remember” and “old” false-alarms and hit rates as two points in zROC space. According
to the one-dimensional model, these two slopes should be equal. However, a meta-
analysis found that this prediction is violated (Rotello et al., 2004). To resolve this
problem, Wixted and Stretch (2004) assumed a variable remember-know criterion in the
one-dimensional model. Monte Carlo simulation showed that this variable-criterion
model produced two-point zROC slopes of the observed magnitude.
A different solution to the two-point zROC slope issue is to extend the one-
dimensional signal model to two dimensions, as in the STREAK model (Sum-Difference
Theory of Remembering and Knowing, Rotello et al., 2004). In the STREAK model, the
old-new and remember-know decisions are made against a decision plane instead of a
decision line, as is shown in Figure 2. The old-new decision bound divides the targets
from the lures: items are called “old” if the sum of global and specific information
exceeds the decision bound. An R-K decision bound divides items called “old” into those
for which the specific memory strength is relatively great compared with global strength
(“remember”) and those for which specific strength is relatively weak (“know”). Thus the
weighted sum of global and specific strengths produces old-new decision and the
weighted difference of strengths produces a “remember” or “know” judgment (Rotello et
al., 2004).
9In STREAK, the “remember/know” criterion is independent of the “old/new”
criterion. This independence leads STREAK to predict that the proportion of “old”
responses that receive “remember” responses will be constant over manipulations of old-
new response bias. Using a between-subjects bias manipulation, Rotello et al. (2006)
observed this pattern in data, which they termed the response-ratio invariant. However,
the experiments using within-subjects manipulations show that “remember” responses are
generally correlated with recognition confidence. This correlation is problematic for
STREAK (Rotello et al., 2004).
In sum, both the one dimensional model and STREAK assume that “remember”
and “know” are based on the same underlying processes and therefore the two judgments
are only quantitatively different. In contrast, dual-process models assume that
“remember” and “know” responses are based on entirely different processes and thus the
two processes are qualitatively different. An insightful review of these mathematical
models can be found in Macmillan and Rotello (2006).
These models generally account for the response probability data well, although
each has difficulty in explaining particular empirical data. Quantitative fits show that the
SDT models explain the data better than the dual-process model (Rotello et al., 2006).
However, with the challenges each model faces, it is still hard to determine which model
provides better description of the data and which makes the most realistic assumptions.
Since the “remember/know” judgments (or “old” judgments followed by
“remember/know” judgments) are made over time, a remember-know model with true
assumptions should be able to account for both response accuracy and response times,
that is, the speed-accuracy tradeoff (Townsend & Ashby, 1983; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998).
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Thus in the following sections, reaction times in remember-know paradigm will be
discussed.
1.4 Reaction times in the remember-know paradigm
In this thesis, the focus is on the reaction time distribution of “remember” and
“know” responses. The data analysis is from a bottom-up perspective: what will reaction
time distributions tell us about how “remember” and “know” judgments are made? If
“remember” and “know” responses are based on the same processes, then examination of
their reaction time distributions should reveal a similar pattern; otherwise, we should see
reaction time distributions that differ in some way.
Reaction time is considered to be very valuable for revealing the mechanism of
cognitive processes (Luce, 1986; Van Zandt, 2000). However, there is not much research
on reaction times for “remember” and “know” responses except some studies that
reported mean RT for each type of judgment.
Dewhurst and Conway (1994) first reported mean RTs to “old” judgments
categorized by whether a subsequent “remember” or “know” response was made. The
mean RT to “old” judgments followed by a “remember” response was significantly faster
than that followed by a “know” response. Yonelinas (2002) explained this finding as a
demand characteristic: the subjects were instructed to respond “know” only when they
failed to recollect specific details, suggesting that those responses should be slower.
Dewhurst et al. (2006) instructed subjects to make “old/new” and “remember/know”
responses in two different test lists. Again, when “old” response RTs were categorized by
the subsequent “remember/know” judgments, the mean “old” RT was shorter when
followed by a “remember” judgment than a “know” judgment. Thus, Yonelinas’ demand
11
characteristics can be ruled out. Dewhurst et al. (2006) proposed an alternative account
that “remember” responses are based on a fast and automatic process that retrieves
detailed contextual information while “know” responses require an evaluative process
that compares the relative familiarity of the item to others on the test. This account will
be examined in the data analyses presented in later chapters.
Relating the mean RT findings to the remember-know models, these results are
consistent with the one-dimensional model given a strength-latency relationship: The
farther away the item strength is from the decision criterion, the faster the response is
(Murdock, 1985). Because the strengths of remembered items are greater than known
items, they are further from the old/new criterion. Therefore “remember” responses
should be faster than “know” responses. Strong evidence was provided in Wixted and
Stretch’s (2004) study: they found that both “remember” hits and “remember” false
alarms were significantly faster than “know” hits.
The issue is not settled, however. When doing reaction time analyses, researchers
generally use the mean RT as the dependent variable, which ignores distributional
information that could reflect theoretically interesting processes. Moreover, the mean RT
can be a misleading measure (Heathcote et al., 1991), because the same mean RT can
occur for a variety of differently shaped RT distributions. Also, models that accurately
predict the ordering of mean RTs may nonetheless fail to account for other aspects of the
RT data, such as skew (Mewhort, Braun, & Heathcote, 1992). We will give examples in
the next section.
Moment-based estimators and cumulants such as skew and kutosis have been
shown to be unsuitable for characterizing the shape of empirical distributions because
12
they suffer from lack of efficiency (i.e. very large sample size are required) and
robustness (i.e., higher order moments are too sensitive to outliers, Ractliff, 1979). Since
RTs can be considered to be a random variable and all the information about a random
variable is contained in its probability density function (PDF or density function) or
cumulative distribution function (CDF), the PDF or CDF can be used to explicate the
reaction times (Luce, 1986). There are many different distribution models to characterize
the shape of the RT density function and CDF. The most common model is the ex-
Gaussian distribution, which is characterized by three parameters— µ ,  and .
1.5 The ex-Gaussian distribution and its applications
The ex-Gaussian is a positively skewed distribution produced by the convolution
of a normal and an exponential distribution. The ex-Gaussian has three parameters, the
mean ( µ ) and the standard deviation ( ) of the normal component and the mean of the
exponential component ( ). The mean of an ex-Gaussian distribution is µ + and its
variance is 22  + .
Because the mean of an ex-Gaussian distribution equals µ + , both µ , the mode
of the distribution, and  , the right tail of the distribution, influence the mean RT.
Because µ and  may vary independently, finding equal mean RTs over conditions does
not imply that the underlying RT distributions are the same: the shape of the distributions
may be quite different. This is illustrated by Figure 3(a). Even when the means and
variances of the reaction times are the same in two conditions, the distributions can differ
as is shown in Figure 3(b). When there is a difference in the means of two conditions, the
difference may be caused by a shift of the normal distribution (µ ) as shown in Figure
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3(c), by a difference in the tail ( ) as shown in Figure 3(d), or by combination of these
differences.
Early application of the ex-Gaussian distribution to RTs assumed that the
parameters of the ex-Gaussian distribution reflected different cognitive processes. For
example, Hohle (1965) suggested that the normal component of the RT represents the
time for organization and execution of motor responses and that the exponential
component reflects the decision time. Though this claim has not been fully supported
empirically, the ex-Gaussian distribution has been shown to fit reaction time well
(Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976). More recently, the ex-Gaussian distribution has been used
for two purposes. First, it has been used to explore the reaction time characteristics of
cognitive processes and to differentiate different types of processes (Spieler, Balota, &
Faust, 2000; Balota & Spieler D., 1999; Wixted & Rohrer, 1994; Heathcote, Popiel, &
Mewhort, 1991; Hockley, 1984; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976). Second, the ex-Gaussian has
been used to evaluate models that account for reaction time distribution characteristics
(Mewhort et al., 1992; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976).
Ratcliff and Murdock (1976) conducted four experiments to investigate the effects
of study and test positions, presentation rate, list length and presentation frequency on
response accuracy and latency. Three functional distributions, gamma, lognormal and ex-
Gaussian, were fit to the latency data. The ex-Gaussian distribution provided the best
results. More importantly, examination of the parameters ( µ ,  , and  ) showed that
different empirical factors were reflected in different RT parameters. For example, study
and test positions, as well as presentation frequency effects were mainly reflected by
values of , whereas the manipulation of list length affected both µ and  .
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Hockley (1984) extended Ratcliff and Murdock’s findings to a variety of
cognitive tasks. Again the parameters µ and  behaved differently across conditions. In a
visual search task, mean RT increased with search set size, and that effect was mainly
reflected by the µ parameter. In contrast, a memory search task revealed that mean RT
increased with search size as a result of increase in the  parameter. A change in µ as a
function of visual search size is consistent with a serial search process assuming fixed
comparison rate, whereas a change in  and a constant µ as a function of memory
search size rules out the serial search process that assumes a constant comparison rate.
More recently Balota and Spieler (1999) fit the ex-Gaussian distribution to word
recognition RTs and found that, in a lexical decision task, the word frequency effect was
primarily reflected by changes in  ; in contrast, in a word-naming task, the word
frequency effect was mainly reflected by changes in µ . Balota and Spieler pointed out
that a greater  for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words in a lexical
decision task indicated that an extra attention demanding check process was engaged for
low-frequency words. In contrast, word-frequency effect was reflected in automatic
process in word naming task, because the same type of check process in the lexical
decision task is not necessary in word naming task.
Later Spieler et al. (2000) used ex-Gaussian distributions to investigate the
interference effect in Stroop task and other selective attention tasks (local/global task
and flanker task). The interference effect in Stroop task is reflected in both µ and  ,
whereas the interference effect in local/global and flanker tasks is reflected in the µ
parameter. Thus the parameters of ex-Gaussian distributions can differentiate the
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mechanisms that underlie Stroop task, where a stimulus attribute was selected, and
local/global and flanker tasks, where a spatial location was selected.
In summary, the ex-Gaussian distribution has been used in many studies to
explore various cognitive processes and to evaluate and develop models. The µ and
 parameters consistently display different patterns across conditions. As argued in
previous research, the  parameter in ex-Gaussian distributions is a more sensitive
indicator of attention-demanding cognitive processes than the µ parameter. In contrast,
µ appear to reflect more automatic process (Balota & Spieler, 1999; Rouder et al.,
2005). Changes in µ and  over experimental manipulations can therefore indicate
changes in automatic process and strategic process respectively (Ratcliff & Murdock,
1979).
Applying this general descriptive approach to the remember-know paradigm, the
distributions of “remember” and “know” RTs could be examined specifically. The
parameters of best-fitting ex-Gaussian distribution to “old/new” responses could be
found for responses that were followed by “remember” or “know” judgments. As
argued in Section 1.3, the one-dimensional and two-dimensional SDT models assume
that the same strategic processes underlies both “remember” and “know” judgments,
whereas the dual-process model assumes that “remember” and “know” judgments are
made based on qualitatively different processes. Therefore comparison of values of the
 parameter fitted to “remember” and “know” judgments can be used to evaluate the
remember-know models. Similar values suggest that same strategic process underlies
“remember” and “know” judgments, and therefore could support the one-dimensional
and the two-dimensional SDT models. In contrast, finding different  values would
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indicate that different processes underlie “remember” and “know” judgments and would
therefore support the dual-process model.
In addition to the  parameter, comparison of the µ parameter will be conducted
to see whether the automatic processes that underlie “remember” and “know” judgments
are same. From the dual-process account, “know” judgment taps on familiarity which is
an automatic process and “remember” judgment taps on recollection which is an
attention demanding process. Thus, µ may display different values for “remember” and
“know” judgments. Dewhurst et al. (2006) explained faster “remember” judgments than
“know” judgments by assuming that “know” judgments involved an evaluative
(attention demanding) process whereas “remember” judgments are more automatic due
to the available vivid contextual information. Dewhurst et al.’s account can also be
examined by compare values of parameter µ and  for “remember” and “know”
judgments: “remember” judgments should have a small µ and  relative to “know”
judgments.
To explore the “remember” and “know” processes with the descriptive approach
mentioned above, and also to test Yonelinas and Dewhurst et al.’s accounts of mean
RTs for “remember” and “know” responses, three experiments were conducted: a list
length experiment, a list strength experiment and a speed-accuracy experiment that
manipulate the response bias by instructing subjects to emphasize speed or accuracy.
The first two experiments were conducted because list length and list strength effects
are well established and investigated, and therefore can serve as a touchstone of basic
performance in our tasks. The third experiment was designed to examine how speed-
accuracy tradeoff may influence the RT distributions of “remember” and “know”
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responses. When accuracy is emphasized, a large value of the  parameter is expected
presumably because subjects could engage complete strategic process before they make
response; when speed is emphasized, a small value of the  parameter is expected,
because under time pressure, only the most available information would be retrieved to
make decision, and therefore the process could be more automatic and less strategic.
1.6 General data analysis methods
The data analytic approach we adopted in each experiment consists of two steps:
First, we conduct an accuracy analysis of the data which includes calculating sensitivity
(i.e., the ability to discriminate studied items from novel items in the recognition
experiment), and fitting the remember-know models to ROC data. Second, we consider
reaction time data, which includes an analysis of both mean RTs and examination of the
RT distributions using the descriptive (ex-Gaussian) approach outlined above.
The remember-know model fits to the ROC data will follow the exact procedures
in Rotello et al. (2006). In that study, five different models were tested: the one-
dimensional model, a variable criterion extension of the one-dimensional model (Wixted
and Stretch, 2004), the dual-process model and STREAK plus an extension of the dual-
process model, in which “remember” hits were assumed to occur at several levels of
confidence. This change makes the extended dual-process model more like the one-
dimensional model (Rotello et al., 2006).
All the models will be fit using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC, Akaike, 1974; Myung et al., 2004) will be used to adjust for
differing numbers of free parameters. AIC is the sum of two terms: one that reflects the
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log-likelihood of the model given the data and another that penalizes the model for free
parameters. Smaller values of AIC indicate better performance of the model.
To fit the ex-Gaussian distribution to reaction time data, we use Heathcote et al.’s
QMPE program (Quantile Maximum Probability Estimation). QMPE exploits quantile
maximum probability estimation which minimizes the effects of outliers and
measurement noise (Cousineau et al., 2004). A Monte Carlo study shows that estimation
performance is fairly good even when the sample size is as small as 40 (Heathcote et al.,
2004). The method’s performance is not known for samples size less than 40, so (with
one exception) we only fit ex-Gaussian distribution to data sets with at least 40
observations.
The output of QMPE includes the estimated values for µ ,  , and  as well as
their estimated standard errors. The output also includes the observed quantiles, the
estimated quantiles, and the contribution of each quantile to the log-likelihood sum.
Most interesting to us is the estimated parameters of µ ,  , and  .
We fit ex-Gaussian distributions to hits that were followed by “remember” and
“know” judgments in two ways1. For each subject, we fit RTs regardless of confidence
level. Because reaction times are correlated with decision confidence (Petrusic &
Baranski, 2003) and “remember” responses often receive higher confidence ratings than
“know” responses, controlling confidence levels is important. We also fit the RTs for
each subject at a particular confidence level that was selected to maximize sample size.
After fitting the ex-Gaussian to the RTs, the most important thing is to compare
the parameter values of µ ,  , and  for hits followed by “remember” and “know”
1 In this thesis, only “remember” and “know” hits were fit by ex-Gaussian distributions. The initial plan is to fit ex-
Gaussian distributions to “old” responses followed by “remember” and “know” judgments. However, there were few
“remember” false alarms. In addition, hits are cleaner than false alarms and so we chose to only fit hits.
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responses. To decide whether the values are the same or different for “remember” and
“know” responses, a bootstrap procedure was used to construct 95% confidence intervals
of the difference between the parameter values for “remember” and “know” responses.
The RTs in each cell (i.e., the RTs for hits followed by “remember” and “know”
judgments in each condition for each subject) were resampled 2000 times, and then each
sample set was fit with an ex-Gaussian distribution using QMPE. These 2000 resample
data sets yielded 2000 parameter estimates of µ ,  , and  for hits followed by
“remember” responses and 2000 for hits followed by “know” responses. We subtracted
the parameter values for “know” response from those for “remember” responses (r-k).
The 50th smallest and 50th largest values of the difference of the three parameters form the
boundaries of the 95% confidence interval for the difference in µ ,  , and  for hits
followed by “remember” or “know” judgments.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1: LIST LENGTH
A list length manipulation is chosen for Experiment 1 because effects associated
with list length have been replicated in many experiments (Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976;
Yonelinas, 1994; Cary & Reder, 2003), and therefore list length effect can be used to
examine the basic performance of the subjects.
In memory research, long study-test lists result in low performance compared
with shorter lists. More specifically, longer lists produce lower hit rate and higher false
alarm rate than shorter lists; this is called a mirror effect. In the remember-know
paradigm, longer lists elicit fewer “remember” responses than shorter lists (Cary & Reder,
2003). Therefore, in this experiment, lower sensitivity and fewer “remember” responses
are expected for long study-test lists than for short lists. Enough data were collected for
individual-level distributional RT analysis.
2.1 Method
1. Participants
Four University of Massachusetts students participated in exchange for $40 cash
payment.
2. Material and design
A pool of 3072 nouns was created. The words varied widely in written frequency
(10-4500, Kucera-Francis) and length (3-15 letters). They were randomly assigned to
roles for each subject: 1) Study words on short (30 words each) or long (90 words each)
list. There were 720 words assigned to each length, yielding 24 Short and 8 Long lists. 2)
An equal number of words (30 or 90) served as lures on the recognition test followed
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each study list. 3) Finally, 3 untested words appeared at the beginning and end of each
study list to absorb primacy and recency effects. These primacy and recency words were
not tested.
Subjects participated individually in 8 sessions. Each session consisted of three
Short study-test blocks and 1 Long study-test block, presented in random order.
Following either type of study list there was a recognition test on all of the studied words
from that block plus an equal number of New words, in a random order. Responses were
made on a Cedrus response box RB 610 with six buttons. With the response box, RTs are
accurate to within 1ms.
3. Procedure
Subjects were told to study the words in each list for a recognition test. Each
study word was presented for 1750ms with an inter-stimulus interval of 250ms. In each
block, after the subjects studied the word list, they immediately proceeded to the test. A
practice block composed of 10 study words and 20 test words was presented before the
formal blocks in the first session (only) so that subjects could become familiarized with
the response procedure.
During the test phase, subjects were instructed to put their ring finger, middle
finger and index finger of each hand on the response pad, placing their left ring finger on
leftmost button (button 1) and their right ring finger on the rightmost button (button 6).
For each test word, the subject made three responses. First, they made an Old/New
decision using their middle fingers pressing button 2 (“new”) or 5 (“old”). Second, they
rated their old-new confidence (1=“sure new”, 6=“sure old”); they were told that they
could reverse their judgment (from “new” to “old” or the opposite) by using the
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appropriate confidence rating. Finally, for the items subjects gave confidence ratings 4
(“maybe old”), 5 (“probably old”) or 6 (“sure old”), they made remember-know
judgments by pressing button 6 to indicate “remember” and button 1 to indicate “know”.
For the items that they gave confidence ratings 1 (“sure new”), 2 (“probably new”) or 3
(“maybe new”), they were instructed to press button 1 for the third response.
Subjects were instructed to make their responses as quickly as possible without
sacrificing accuracy. Reaction times to all three responses were recorded. However, only
the reaction times to the “old/new” decision are evaluated. Those responses are cleanest
(i.e., no carry-on effects from prior judgments) and analogous RTs have been used in
previous studies (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Dewhurst et al., 2006).
2.2 Results
As described earlier, the data analysis results will be presented in two sections:
first accuracy (or response probability) based analyses and then reaction time analyses.
The accuracy analysis results include sensitivity estimates for each condition, the
response proportions of “remember”, “know” and “new” judgments, and comparison of
the remember-know model fits to ROC data. The results of reaction time data analysis
include the mean RT analysis and the fits of ex-Gaussian distribution to the data. Further
discussion will be based on the values of the parameters of best-fit ex-Gaussian
distribution.
Subjects reversed their old/new responses on 2.3% of trials by giving confidence
ratings that contradicted their initial response. These reversed responses were included in
the accuracy analyses but those trials were excluded from the reaction time analyses. The
confidence ratings determine the final judgment. For example, if “new” was the correct
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response and the subject initially responded “old” (an error) but specified either “1”, “2”,
or “3” (the three new ratings) as the confidence level, we counted the judgment to be
correct.
2.2.1 Accuracy analysis
The average hit rate for the four subjects is 0.80 for short lists and 0.70 for Long
lists; the average false alarm rate is 0.13 for Short lists and 0.20 for long lists. A one-way
analysis of variance for hits showed significant effect of list length, F(1, 3) = 13.294, p
< .05. For false alarms, marginal significance was found for list length, F(1, 3) = 8.347, p
= .063. This generally replicates the list length mirror effect observed in previous studies
(Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976; Yonelinas, 1994; Cary & Reder, 2003) which leads to higher
sensitivity for short lists than for long lists.
The confidence ratings were used to create ROCs and zROCs (see Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005 for technical details). The slopes of zROCs are less than 1.0 (see Table 1),
indicating that the Old item distribution is more variable than the New item distribution.
When the slope is not 1.0, 'd is no longer an accurate measurement of sensitivity: it
confounds sensitivity with response bias (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Therefore, a
more accurate index, ad , is adopted for sensitivity measurement which takes zROC
slope into account (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 'd measures the distance of the
means of distributions of old and new items normalized by the standard deviation of
either old or new items (because they are assumed to be equal); ad also measures the
distance of the means of distributions of old and new items, however the distance is
normalized by the root mean square of the standard deviations of old and new items.
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Thus 'd is a special case of ad : when the standard deviations of the old and new items
are the same, 'd is equal to ad .
In this experiment, the overall ad is 1.75 for Short condition and 1.18 for Long
condition. The ad values for individual subjects are shown in Table 1. A paired t-test
revealed a significant difference in sensitivities for the Long and Short lists (t(3) = 5.66, p
< .05).
1. “Remember” and “know” response proportions
Table 2 shows the overall proportions of “old” and “new” responses that were
followed by “remember” and “know” judgments. Long lists elicited significantly fewer
“remember” hits than Short lists (t(3) = 5.218, p < .05), whereas “remember” false alarms
are not different for Long and Short lists (t(3) = .195, n.s.), replicating Cary and Reder
(2003). As for “know” responses, both “know” hits and false alarms are similar across
Long and Short condition (For hits, t(3) = 2.191, n.s. and for false alarms, t(3) = 2.095,
n.s), which is different from what Cary and Reder observed: they found that there were
more “know” hits and false alarms for longer lists than for shorter lists.
As discussed by Hirshman and Master (1997), difference combinations of
establishment of criteria (“old”/”new” criterion and “remember”/“know” criterion) by
subjects could result in three situations under experimental manipulations: “remember”
hit rate is larger for Condition Two than for Condition One whereas “know” hit rate is
larger for Condition One than Condition Two, as observed in Cary and Reder and
illustrated in Panel 2 of Figure 2 in Hirshman and Master (1997, note that “know” false
alarm rate is larger for Condition One than for Condition Two, consistent with what Cary
and Reder found); “remember” hit rate is larger for Condition Two than for Condition
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One whereas “know” hit rates are similar across the two conditions, as observed in our
Experiment 1 and illustrated in Panel 1 of Figure 2 in Hirshman and Master (1997, note
that “know” false alarm rates are similar across the two conditions, consistent with what
is found in Experiment 1); “know” hit rate is larger for Condition One than for Condition
Two whereas “remember” hit rates are similar, as illustrated in Panel 3 of Figure 2 in
Hirshman and Master (1997).
2. Remember-know model fits
The “old/new” responses at each confidence level that received “remember” and
“know” judgments were fit by five models described in Section 1.6.
The one-dimensional model was implemented with 8 parameters: one sensitivity
estimate (d), 6 decision criteria ( 1C - 5C for old-new confidence ratings and rC for
remember-know judgment), and the slope of zROC (s). One additional parameter was
required to fit the one-dimensional model with variable criterion: the standard deviation
of the remember-know criterion distribution (1/t).
The dual-process model was implemented with 8 parameters. There are two
sensitivity parameters: 0R and 'd . 0R reflects the fraction of trials in which true
recollection occurs whereas 'd is the sensitivity measure for the familiarity process.
There are 5 decision criteria ( 1C - 5C ) to divide the old-new responses into confidence
ratings. Finally, the fraction of trials on which false recollection operated is  . Therefore,
familiarity is effective on a fraction, 01 R , of the target trials and on 1 of the lure
trials. In the extended dual-process model, two more parameters were added to allow
“remember” responses to distribute over all “old” ratings.
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STREAK also has 9 parameters: 6 criteria ( 1C - 5C and rC ), 2 sensitivity
parameters ( xd and yd ) and the slope of the zROC (s). 1C - 5C represent the five criteria
that divide responses into confidence ratings and these five decision bounds are parallel
to the old/new decision bound and perpendicular to the remember/know decision
bound. rC is the remember/know criterion that divides the “old” responses into
“remember” and “know” judgments. xd measures the memory sensitivity for global
information and yd measures sensitivity for specific information.
Table 3 shows the results of AIC statistics for the five models2. Small numbers
indicate better fits. The one-dimensional model in one of its two forms fits 6 out of the 8
conditions. In two conditions (B Short and D Short), the dual-process model fits best.
Overall, the one-dimensional models provide the best fit. However, it should be noted
that some differences are quite small.
To compare the performance of the one-dimensional models and the dual-process
model, Figure 4 illustrates the best and worst model fits3 for four representative cases:
Long and Short conditions for Subject A (best fit with the variable-criterion one-
dimensional model), Short condition for Subject B and D (best fit with the dual-process
model). For the first two cases, the one-dimensional model with variable remember-know
criterion provided the best fits whereas the dual-process model provided the worst fits;
for the latter two cases, the dual-process model provided the best fits whereas one-
2 We also calculated BIC and Akaike weights for the fitting results. The results agree with AIC statistics.
3 The illustration of the best and worst model fit is confined within the one-dimensional models and the dual-process
models, since STREAK provided poorest fits to the ROC data in the three experiments conducted. This is due to that it
does not predict the correlation between the confidence ratings and “remember/know” responses observed in the data
(see Rotello et al., 2004; Rotello et al., 2006).
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dimensional models (variable remember-know criterion version for B and fixed
remember-know criterion version for D) provided the worst fits.
Overall, all models provided decent fit to the data as shown in Figure 4, and the
difference in the goodness-of-fit for the one-dimensional model and dual-process model
mainly present in the “remember” and “know” response proportions at the two highest
confidence rating. Table 4 displays the observed response proportions for “remember”
judgments at each “old” rating and the corresponding proportions predicted by the best-fit
and worst-fit models. For the Long and Short condition of Subject A, the problem faced
by the dual-process model is that it assumes “remember” responses are made with highest
confidence, but subjects spread the responses across the ratings for “old” items and
therefore, the one dimensional SDT model fits these data better. In the Short condition for
Subjects B and D, more than 98% “remember” judgments are made with confidence level
6; therefore the dual-process model fits better.
2.2.2 Reaction time data analysis
1. Mean RT analysis
We began by using the RTs to “Old/New” judgments as the primary dependent
measure (See also Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Dewhurst et al., 2006).
The mean RTs for hits and false alarms are presented in Table 5. Since there are
only four subjects in this study, we do not have enough power to detect the difference in
group mean RTs for “remember” and “know” responses. However, the study was
designed to test effects at the level of the individual.
For all four subjects, independent two-sample t-tests revealed that the mean RTs
to “old” response followed by “remember” judgments are significantly faster than those
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followed by “know” judgments (minimum tobserved = 7.223, p = .000). This result
replicates Dewhurst and Conway (1994; see also Dewhurst et al., 2005).
The difference between the mean RTs to hits followed by “remember” and
“know” judgments is also significant (minimum tobserved = 6.321, p = 0.000), whereas
there is no difference between the mean RTs to false alarms (maximum tobserved = 1.143, p
> .2). When Long and Short conditions are considered separately, the effects of mean
RTs to hits are still significant (minimum tobserved = 3.549, p = .000). However,
“remember” judgments tend to be given at higher confidence ratings, and “know”
judgments tend to be given at lower confidence levels. Reaction times increase as
confidence rating decreases (Petrusic & Baranski, 2003). In Experiment 1, the average
correlation between “old” confidence ratings and mean RTs for hits is -.90 (The more
confident subjects were, the less time it took for them to make responses) for Long
condition and -.95 for Short condition. Therefore, it is indispensable to control
confidence level when doing RT data analysis.
When controlled for confidence levels, the difference between mean RTs is
greatly reduced. After conducting all possible t-tests for hits in long and short conditions
for each subject4, the difference in mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” and
“know” responses is only significant for one condition: hits for Subject C in the Long
condition at confidence rating 5 (t(26.8) = 3.678, p = .001). However, the mean RT for
hits followed by “remember” is larger than that followed by “know”, which is opposite to
what was observed regardless of confidence level.
4 There should be 24 t-tests (4 subjects × 2 list lengths × 3 “old” confidence ratings) in total; however, due to the
insufficient number (<10) in most cells, only 6 t-tests were conducted
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When the confidence ratings were collapsed, the mean RTs for hits followed by
“remember” are significantly faster than those followed by “know” responses; when the
confidence levels are controlled, the differences in the mean RTs for hits followed by
“remember” and “know” disappeared (in one case, the mean RTs for hits followed by
“remember” is significantly slower than that followed by “know” responses). Therefore,
we can conclude that effect of mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” and “know”
responses are mainly due to the difference in response confidence for “remember” and
“know” judgments. When confidence level is controlled, the difference is greatly
reduced.
2. Distributional RT analysis
The parameter values of the ex-Gaussian fits as well as mean and standard
deviations for each subject are shown in Table 6 when confidence level is ignored and
when it is controlled. When confidence level is controlled, only Subject A and D
provided enough hits (>40, with one exception) followed by “remember” and “know”
judgments.
As has been presented, the mean RTs are significantly different for hits followed
by “remember” and “know” judgments for each subject in both Long and Short
conditions when confidence ratings are collapsed. It is an intriguing question whether
the differences in mean RTs presented in the µ parameter or the  parameter or both.
Using the bootstrapping procedure described in Section 1.6, the 95% confidence
intervals of the differences of the best-fit ex-Gaussian parameter values of hits followed
by “remember” and “know” judgments were calculated and presented in Table 7. Also
presented in Table 7 are 95% confidence intervals of the differences for Subject A at
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confidence rating 5 and for Subject D at confidence 6. If the 95% confidence intervals
include 0, the differences in the parameter values are not significant; otherwise if the
95% confidence intervals do not include 0, the differences in the parameter values are
significant.
From Table 7, significant differences in the µ parameter, the  parameter or the
combinations of these two parameters result in the significant differences in mean RTs
for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments. For Subject B in the Short
condition and Subject C in the Long condition, only values of the µ parameter are
significantly different; for Subject A in the Long condition and Subject D in the Short
condition, only values of the  parameter are significantly different; for the rest four
cases, Subject A in the Short condition, Subject B in the Long condition, Subject C in
the Short condition and Subject D in the Long condition, both the differences in the µ
and  parameters are significant.
However, when the confidence level is controlled, no difference existed in the µ ,
 and  parameters. This result accords well with the mean RT data analysis results, in
which no difference in mean RTs was found between hits followed by a “remember”
and those followed by a “know” response for Subject A and D when confidence level is
controlled.
It should be noted that the 95% confidence intervals in Table 7 are quite wide,
which is due to the large variances of the reaction times. When the bootstrapping
procedure is implemented, the samples could vary dramatically and therefore the best-fit
ex-Gaussian parameters are quite different. The wide 95% confidence intervals made
the results not compelling enough for a strong conclusion. However, the confidence
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intervals are smaller for larger and more balanced “remember” and “know” sample
sizes.
Figure 5 illustrates the RT distributions for hits that were given “remember” and
“know” judgments in the Long condition for Subject A at Rating 5 and Subject D at
Rating 6. The best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution was superimposed on each empirical
distribution. Figure 6 shows the analogous data for the short condition. The figures
showed that the fits of the ex-Gaussian distribution to the reaction times are generally
good.
As is argued in Section 1.5,  is an indicator of strategic processing. When the
values of  are similar across two conditions, the two conditions involve similar
strategic processes, i.e., similar retrieval and decision processes. In addition, when the
confidence level is controlled, the values of the µ parameter, which indicate the
automatic processes involved in decision, do not differ. Therefore, we conclude here
that “remember” and “know” do not differ in their underlying processes when the
confidence level is controlled and this supports the one-dimensional and two-
dimensional signal detection models.
2.3 Discussion
The application of remember-know models to the accuracy data shows that the
one-dimensional SDT model (with either fixed or variable remember-know criterion)
explains the most data. The dual-process model fit the data better than one-dimensional
model for the short condition of Subject B and D. In these two cases, the “remember”
judgments concentrated at confidence 6 and this is consistent with the assumption of the
dual-process model that “remember” responses are of highest confidence (Yonelinas,
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1994). However, for the other six cases, the one dimensional SDT model provided best
fits. The implication is that a continuous process underlies “remember” judgments in this
experiment, consistent with findings in previous research (Rotello et al., 2004; Rotello et
al., 2005; Rotello et al., 2006).
Dewhurst et al. (2006)’s mean RT results are replicated here: mean RTs to “old”
responses followed by “remember” judgments are faster than those followed by “know”
judgments. In addition, the mean RT for hits followed by “remember” is significantly
faster than those followed by “know” judgments. However, this is mainly due to the
different confidence levels: “remember” judgments tend to concentrate at confidence
level 5 or 6 and “know” judgments at confidence level 4 or 5. When the confidence level
is controlled, there is no difference in mean RTs to hits followed by “remember” and
“know” judgments. In one case, the mean RT is faster to hits followed by “know”
judgments than by “remember” judgments.
The ex-Gaussian distribution fits to RT data shows that when confidence level is
controlled, the skew parameter  , which is the indicator of the strategic processes, shows
no difference in best-fit values for hits followed by “remember” judgments and “know”
judgments. This is consistent with the signal detection interpretations of remember-know
judgments (Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Wixted & Stretch, 2004;
Rotello et al., 2004) and inconsistent with the dual-process model (Murdock, 2006;
Yonelinas, 2001; Reder et al., 2000).
In Dewhurst et al. (2006), the authors argued that the difference in mean “old”
RTs for “remember” and “know” judgments is because the “remember” judgment is a
rapid automatic process and a “know” judgment is a conscious, controlled process that
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involves an evaluative process. The type of information available at test determines the
speed of the “old” responses. This predicts larger  values for hits followed by
“remember” judgments than those followed by “know” judgments. In this experiment,
when confidence level is collapsed, this prediction holds. However, when the confidence
level is controlled, the difference in mean RTs for “remember” and “know” judgments
disappears. Neither µ nor  differ for hits followed by “remember” and “know”
judgments. Therefore, we argue that it is the confidence level that caused the difference
in mean RTs to hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments.
In addition, Dewhurst et al. (2006) assumes that when subjects make “remember”
or “know” judgments, either contextual information or familiarity is used to make the
decision. This is consistent with the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994): a “remember”
judgment taps recollection and a “know” judgment taps familiarity. In contrast, the
variable-criterion one-dimensional model (Wixted and Stretch, 2004; Wixted, 2007) and
STREAK (Rotello et al., 2004) both assume that recollection (or specific information)
and familiarity (or global information) are used together to make “remember” and
“know” decisions. In this experiment, the one-dimensional models provided best fits to
the data, and the one-dimensional model assumes that both recollection and familiarity
are used to make “remember” and “know” decisions. Therefore, the conclusion here is
that subjects did not use either contextual information or familiarity to make “remember”
and “know” judgments, both information are used to make the decision.
For Subjects B and D, the remember-know model fits are similar: one-
dimensional models provide best fits for Long condition (standard for Subject B and
extended version with variable remember-know criterion for Subject D). This may be due
34
to the high performance in the Short condition for Subject B and D ( ad is 2.30 for
Subjects B and 2.55 for Subject D). When study list only consists of 30 words, the
memory strengths could be so strong that “remember” responses are mainly made with
highest confidence and display a high-threshold-like pattern in ROC data.
For Subject D in Short condition, the remember-know model fits and ex-Gaussian
fit are in conflict: dual-process model fits the ROC data best while none of the values of
the µ ,  or  parameters differ for “remember” and “know” responses. The conflicting
implications may reflect the limitation in AIC statistics. As pointed out in Myung et al.
(2004), model fit results consist of two parts: generalizability and overfitting. It may be
that dual-process model overfit the noise and the one-dimensional models have better
generalizability. Another possibility is that the two models mimic each other and thus
both can describe the data well (See Figure 4, also see Cohen, Rotello & Macmillan, in
preparation).
To summarize, the results of the list length experiment support the one-
dimensional SDT models better from both response accuracy and response times. .
In this study, reaction time data are used together with accuracy data to evaluate
remember-know models. Again, reaction time data prove to be useful information to
reveal underlying cognitive processes. The ex-Gaussian distribution fit the data well for
most of the conditions and the skew of the ex-Gaussian distribution differentiate strategic
processes.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2: LIST STRENGTH
In Experiment 1, list length was manipulated within subjects. Two subjects
contributed enough data to evaluate their RT distributions for “remember” and “know”
judgments while controlling confidence. In Experiment 2, word frequency and
presentation frequency were manipulated within subjects. Word frequency effect and
presentation frequency effect have been well established and can be used to test subjects’
performance. For the subjects’ accuracy performance, prior results lead us to expect a
word-frequency mirror effect (more hits and fewer false alarms for low frequency items
than for high frequency items) and a list strength effect (higher sensitivity for more
frequently presented items, Glanzer & Adams, 1985; Stretch & Wixted, 1998; Cary &
Reder, 2003).
Two levels of word frequency (high and low) and three levels of presentation
frequency (study items presented one time, three times or five times) were employed, and
therefore there were 6 within-subject conditions. It was expected that each subject would
contribute more overlapping RT data for “remember” and “know” responses binned by
the confidence ratings as the number of conditions increases. However, due to the limited
amount of words in the word pool, there may not be sufficient words in each condition
for distributional RT data analysis.
3.1 Method
1．Participants
Four University of Massachusetts students participated in exchange for an $80
cash payment.
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2．Stimuli and design
A pool of 2188 nouns is created: 1094 nouns are of Kucera-Francis written
frequency 41-10600 per million (high-frequency words) and the other 1094 nouns are of
Kucera-Francis written frequency 3-5 per million (low-frequency words). Nouns are 3-15
characters in length.
Subjects participated individually in 8 sessions. The first two sessions are practice
sessions to familiarize the subjects with the response routines. Low and high-frequency
adjectives and verbs were used in the practice sessions. None of the words presented in
the practice sessions were repeated in the formal sessions.
Each session consisted of four blocks. In each block, the study list was composed
of 21 low frequency words and 21 high frequency words. Seven of the 21 low frequency
words were presented once, seven were presented three times and seven were presented
five times; so were the 21 high frequency words: 7 presented once, 7 presented three
times and 7 presented five times. In total there were 132 items in each study list including
3 words at the beginning and 3 words at the end to absorb primacy and recency effects.
The words used to absorb primacy and recency effects were not tested. Previous study
shows that spaced presentations have larger effect on response accuracy and result in
larger “remember” rates compared with massed presentation (Parkin & Russo, 1993).
Therefore in this experiment, the study lists were generated in a way to make sure that
there are at least 7 words between the presentations of the same word.
In each test list, there were 42 low frequency words (half old and half new) and
42 high frequency words (half old and half new. In total there were 84 test items in each
test list.
37
3．Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.
3.2 Results
The data analysis of will be presented in the same way as for Experiment 1: first
the accuracy analysis results will be presented including sensitivity, response proportions
of “remember” and “know” judgments, and remember-know model fits; then the reaction
time data analysis will be presented, including the mean RT data analysis and the fits of
the ex-Gaussian distribution to the RTs.
Subjects reversed their old/new responses on 1.5% of trials by giving confidence
ratings that contradicted their initial response. As in Experiment 1, these reversed
responses were included in the accuracy analyses but were excluded from the reaction
time analyses. The confidence ratings determined the final judgment.
3.2.1 Accuracy analysis
A repeated-measures ANOVA for hits rates with word frequency and presentation
frequency as within-subjects factors showed significant main effect for presentation
frequency, F(2, 6) = 30.390, p < .01. No word frequency effect was found (F(1, 3) =
2.318, n. s.) and the interaction of these two factors was not significant (F(2, 6) = .688, n.
s.). The null word frequency effect on hits rates could be due to a ceiling effect: the
subjects had good performance when the words were presented five times, and this
resulted in small difference in hit rates across word frequencies (average .80 for low-
frequency words and .85 for high-frequency words).
A one-way ANOVA done for false alarm rates with word frequency as within-
subjects factor showed no effect (F(1, 3) = 3.612, n. s.). Analogous to the null effect for
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hit rates, the null effect for false alarm rates could be due to a floor effect (average .02 for
high-frequency words and .01 for low-frequency words).
As in Experiment 1, the zROC slope in each condition is smaller than 1 (see Table
8), and therefore ad is calculated to measure sensitivity and the ad values are shown in
Table 8 for each subject and each condition. Subject A had exceptionally high
performance (average hit rate was .89 and average false alarm rate was .01) which made
some analyses difficult.
A two-way repeated analysis of variance with word frequency and presentation
frequency as within-subject factors revealed significant main effects of both word
frequency (F(1, 3) = 18.426, p < .05), and presentation frequency (F(2, 6) = 26.877, p
< .01). Low-frequency words resulted in higher ad (2.63) than high-frequency words
(2.06), and higher presentation frequency resulted in higher ad ( ad is 2.97 for words
presented 5 times, 2.32 for words presented 3 times, and 1.74 for words presented once).
The interaction between these two factors was not significant (F(2, 6) = .356, n. s.).  
1. “Remember” and “know” response proportions
The average “remember” and “know” response proportions for the four subjects
are presented in Table 9.
A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for “remember” hits with
word frequency and presentation frequency as within-subject factors. The proportion of
“remember” hits is significantly increased with the increase of presentation frequency
(F(2, 6) = 13.791, p < .01). Word frequency did not affect “remember” hits (F(1, 3) =
5.469, n. s.) and there is no interaction of word frequency and presentation frequency
(F(1, 3) = .533, n. s.). A one-way ANOVA was conducted for “remember” false alarms
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with word frequency as within-subject factor. Word frequency had no effect on
“remember” false alarm rate (F(1, 3) = .744, n. s. ).
The same analyses were repeated for “know” hits and false alarms. Neither word
frequency nor presentation frequency influenced “know” hit rates. For word frequency,
F(1, 3) = 1.023, n. s.; for presentation frequency, F(2, 6) = 0.219, n. s.. In addition, no
effect of word frequency was found for “know” false alarm rates (F(1, 3) = 2.439, n. s.).
2. Remember-know model fits
The same five models that were depicted in Section 1.3 were fit to the response
accuracy data: one-dimensional model, one-dimensional model with variable
remember/know criterion, dual-process model, extended dual-process model and
STREAK.
The models failed to fit Subject A’s data well, presumably because there were
many empty cells in the ROC data: Subject A’s responses were concentrated in the two
extreme ratings, 1 and 6. Therefore the remember-know model fits were only conducted
for Subject B, C, and D. 
Subjects in Experiment 2 were quite consistent according to the remember-know
model fits. From the AIC values shown in Table 10, Subject B’s data were best fit with
the dual-process model (in one case, extended dual-process model); Subject C and
Subject D were best fit with one-dimensional SDT model with variable criterion (except
in one case for Subject D, STREAK provided best fit).  
 To summarize, the one-dimensional model with variable remember-know
criterion provided the best account of the data for two subjects and the dual-process
model fit one subject’s data best.
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3.2.2 Reaction time analysis
1. Mean RT analysis
The mean RT for hits and false alarms followed by “remember” and “know”
judgments are shown in Table 11.
As Experiment 1, this experiment is designed for individual RT data analysis.
Therefore, the comparisons of mean RTs for “remember” and “know” judgments were
conducted within subjects with independent two-sample t-tests in each condition.
For Subject A and C, the hits were mostly followed by “remember” judgments.
Due to the imbalanced “remember” and “know” response proportions in each condition
for Subject A and C, only Subject B and D provided enough data (>10) for t-tests on RTs
for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments (In one condition for Subject D,
there was not enough data).
For Subject B, hits followed by “remember” judgments were made faster than
those followed by “know” in every condition (minimum tobserved = 5.544, p = .000); for
Subject D, the mean RTs were shorter for hits followed by “remember” than “know” in
two conditions: high-frequency words presented 1 time (t(20.7) = 3.084, p < .01) and
low-frequency words presented 3 times (t(85.2) = 2.761, p < .015). No differences were
found for other three conditions for Subject D: high-frequency words presented 5 times,
low-frequency words presented once and 5 times.
For Subject B and D, hits followed by “remember” judgments were made with
confidence rating 6, whereas those followed by “know” judgments were made with
confidence rating 4 and 5. In addition, as mentioned before, hits were mostly followed by
5 Since 5 tests were done for Subject D, the criterion p is set as .01 to control the family-wise error
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“remember” judgments for Subject A and C. Therefore, there was not enough data to do
the mean RT analyses when the confidence level was controlled.
2. Distributional RT analyses
As argued in Experiment 1, due to the correlation between reaction times and
confidence level (.91 in Experiment 2), the distributional RT analyses are supposed to be
done when confidence level is controlled. However, there were not enough data for
distributional RT analyses when confidence level is controlled. Therefore, distributional
RT analyses were conducted on reaction times collapsed across confidence ratings.
Subject B provided enough data (>40) for ex-Gaussian distribution fit in four
conditions: high-frequency words presented once, three times, five times and low-
frequency words presented once. Table 12 showed that faster hits followed by
“remember” judgments than those followed by “know” judgments for Subject B were due
to the differences in the µ parameter. Figure 7 illustrates the RT distributions for hits
that were given “remember” and “know” judgments for high and low-frequency words
presented once for Subject B. The best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution was superimposed on
each empirical distribution. Comparing the distributions of hits followed by “remember”
and “know” judgments, the skews (reflected by ) are similar; however, the distribution
were shifted to right (reflected by µ ) for hits followed by “know” judgments relative to
that followed by “remember” judgments.
Subject D provided enough data (>40, with one exception) in two conditions:
low-frequency words presented three times and five times. For Subject D, faster hits
followed by “remember” than those followed by “know” judgments for low-frequency
words presented three times are due to the difference in  . Note that for the low-
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frequency words presented five times for Subject D, there was no difference in mean RTs
for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments; however, the differences in µ
and  parameters are in opposite directions and therefore the mean RTs (which equals the
sum of µ and  ) were the same across “remember” and “know” judgments. Figure 8
shows the RT distributions for hits that were given “remember” and “know” judgments
for low-frequency words presented three and five times for Subject D. Comparing the
distributions of hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments for low-frequency
words presented three times, the skew (reflected by ) is large for hits followed by
“know” judgments relative to that followed by “remember” judgments, whereas the mode
positions are similar. For low-frequency words presented five times, the distribution were
shifted to left (reflected by µ ) for hits followed by “know” judgments relative to that
followed by “remember” judgments, whereas the skew (reflected by ) is large for hits
followed by “know” judgments relative to that followed by “remember” judgments.
Therefore, the mean RTs are similar.
3.3 Discussion
The remember-know model fits to ROC data indicated individual differences. The
one-dimensional model with variable remember-know criterion provided best fits for
Subjects C and D (except for one case, STREAK fit best) and the dual-process model
provides best account for Subject B. These results suggest that different subjects could
adopt different strategies to encode and retrieve information and that these differences
were reflected in the model fits. For Subject C and D, the one-dimensional model with
variable remember-know criterion provided significantly better fits than the standard one-
dimensional model (The average AIC value is 1472 for the one-dimensional model with
43
variable remember-know criterion and 1490 for the standard one-dimensional model, t(11)
= 10.751, p = .000), suggesting that subjects could change the remember-know criterion
from time to time (Wixted & Stretch, 2004).
The analysis of the mean RTs generally replicated what was found by Dewhurst
et al. (2006): hits followed by “remember” judgments are made faster than “know”
judgments. However, in three conditions for Subject D, no differences were found for
mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments.
The ex-Gaussian distribution fit could only be conducted for Subjects B and D
for the conditions that provided enough data when confidence ratings were collapsed.
The results showed that for Subject B, the differences in the mean RTs for hits followed
by “remember” and “know” judgments were due to the µ parameter. For Subject D, in
one condition (low-frequency words presented three times), the difference in the mean
RTs for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments was due to the  parameter;
in another condition (low-frequency words presented five times), there was no difference
in the mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments. Examination
of the µ and  parameters showed that these two parameters were different in opposite
directions.
Experiment 2 did not provide useful data for distributional RT analysis when
confidence level is controlled. In this study, there were 2016 test words and 12 conditions
(3 presentation frequencies × 2 word frequencies × 2 old/new conditions) and therefore in
each condition there were 84 words. If the hit rate is 1 and the subjects uniformly
distributed confidence ratings, there were only 28 words in each rating. In addition,
“remember” and “know” judgments were imbalanced at confidence levels: The
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confidence ratings followed by “remember” judgments were mostly 6 and the confidence
ratings followed by “know” judgments were mostly 4 or 5.
Therefore, in next experiment, the main goal is to increase the word amount in
each condition so that there will be enough data for distribution RT data analysis when
confidence level is controlled. In addition, appropriate difficulty should be obtained for
the task to elicit balanced “remember” and “know” judgments when binned in each
confidence level.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 3: ACCURACY-SPEED BIAS
In Experiment 2, due to insufficient amount of words in each condition and high
performance of the subjects, there were not enough data for distributional RT analyses on
hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments when confidence level was
controlled.
In this experiment, a pilot study was done to decide the lengths of study lists and
test lists, so that there were enough words in each condition and the task would not be too
easy. The results showed that 56 words in study lists and 112 words in test lists may
result in appropriate difficulty and elicit more balanced “remember” and “know”
responses. Therefore, the study list length and test list length were set as 56 and 112
words respectively.
It is an intriguing question how Accuracy-Speed response bias will influence the
µ and  parameter values of best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution for hits followed by
“remember” and “know” responses. Therefore, an Accuracy-Speed response bias was
manipulated within subjects by asking the subjects to make responses “as fast as
possible” or “as accurately as possible”. Another within-subjects manipulation is word
frequency and therefore word frequency effect on sensitivity is expected. In addition, as
mentioned in Section 1.5, large skews in RT distributions are expected in the Accuracy
condition relative to the Speed condition because compared with the Speed condition,
strategic process should be thoroughly exerted in the Accuracy condition and therefore
producing large skews due to the prolonged reaction times.
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4.1 Method
1．Participants
Four University of Massachusetts students participated in exchange for an $80
cash payment.
2．Material and design
The stimuli were 3304 words including nouns, verbs and adjectives where 1652
words were of Kucera-Francis written frequency 40-10600 per million (high-frequency
words) and the other 1652 words were of Kucera-Francis written frequency 1 per million
(low-frequency words). Words were 3 to 15 letters in length.
High-frequency words and low-frequency words were randomly assigned to roles:
1) Study lists. 28 high frequency and 28 low frequency words forms one study list; in
total 784 high frequency words and 784 lower frequency words were used to yield 28
study lists; 2) An equal number of words (28 high-frequency words and 28 low-
frequency words) served as lures on the recognition test that followed each study list. 3)
Finally, 3 untested words appeared at the beginning and end of each study list to absorb
primacy and recency effects.
Subjects participate individually in 7 sessions. Each session consisted of 4 blocks.
In two blocks, the subjects were told to make responses as fast as possible and we name it
Speed condition; in the other two blocks, the subjects were told to make responses as
accurately as possible and we name it Accuracy condition. Speed conditions and
Accuracy conditions alternated within a session. The conditions to start with were
counterbalanced across the subjects over the 7 sessions. For two subjects, four sessions
were Accuracy-Speed-Accuracy-Speed and three sessions were Speed-Accuracy-Speed-
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Accuracy; for other two subjects, four blocks were Speed-Accuracy-Speed-Accuracy and
three blocks were Accuracy-Speed-Accuracy-Speed.
Before each block, there was a practice block composed of 10 study words and 20
test words to prepare the subject for that condition. For each test word in a practice block
in the Accuracy condition, an error response would elicit a feedback: “Wrong! Please
make response as ACCURATELY as possible!” For each test word in a practice block in
the Speed condition, a response longer than 1200ms will elicit a feedback: “Too slow!
Please make response as FAST as possible!” Subjects were asked to apply the bias, either
toward speed or accuracy, to “old/new” responses throughout the block.
3．Procedures
The procedure was same as in Experiment 1 and 2.
4.2 Results
The data analysis were presented in the same way as for Experiment 1 and 2: First
the accuracy analysis results were presented including sensitivity, response proportions of
“remember” and “know” judgments, and remember-know model fits; then the reaction
time data analysis were presented, including the mean RT data analysis and the
distributional RT data analysis.
Subjects reversed their old/new responses on 0.4% of trials by giving confidence
ratings that contradicted their initial response. As in Experiment 1 and 2, these reversed
responses were included in the accuracy analyses but were excluded from the reaction
time analyses. The confidence ratings determined the final judgment.
48
4.2.1 Accuracy analysis
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted for hit rates and false alarm rates
with word frequency and Accuracy-Speed bias manipulations as within-subjects factors.
Low-frequency words resulted in marginally significantly higher hit rate (mean =
.85) than high-frequency words (mean = .74, F(1, 3) = 8.899, p = .058). Accuracy
condition resulted in higher hit rate (mean = .84) than Speed condition (mean = .76, F(1,
3) = 33.924, p < .05). No interaction of these two factors was found, F(1, 3) = 0.997, n. s..
Low-frequency words resulted in lower false alarm rate (mean =.09) than high-
frequency words (mean = .20, F(1, 3) = 103.383, p < .01). Accuracy condition resulted in
lower false alarm rate (mean = .13) than Speed condition (mean = .16, F(1, 3) = 19.879, p
< .05). The interaction of these two factors was not significant, F(1, 3) = 0.783, n. s..
As in Experiment 1 and 2, because the zROC slopes were less than 1 (see Table
13), ad was used to measure sensitivity. Table 13 shows ad values for each subject in
each condition.
Low-frequency words resulted in higher ad values (mean = 2.46) than high-
frequency words (mean = 1.64) and the Accuracy condition elicited higher ad values
(mean = 2.23) than the Speed condition (mean = 1.87). A repeated-measures ANOVA
with word frequency and Accuracy-Speed bias as within-subjects factors yielded reliable
main effects for both word frequency (F(1, 3) = 38.178, p < .01) and Accuracy/Speed
bias manipulation (F(1, 3) = 25.75, p < .05). There was no interaction of these two
factors (F(1, 3) =.026, n. s.).
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1. “Remember” and “know” response proportions
The manipulations of both word frequency and Accuracy-Speed bias affected
“remember” hit rates but not “remember” false alarms. Word frequency mirror effect was
found for “know” judgments. Accuracy-Speed bias affected “know” false alarms but not
“know” hits. Table 14 shows the proportions of hits and false alarms followed by
“remember” and “know” judgments in each condition collapsed over the subjects.
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were done for “remember” hits and false alarms as
well as “know” hits and false alarms with word frequency and Accuracy-Speed bias as
within-subjects factors.
Low-frequency words received more “remember” hits (mean = .65) than high-
frequency words (mean = .45, F(1, 3) = 19.615, p < .05), and more “remember” hits were
made in the Accuracy condition (mean = .57) than in the Speed condition (mean = .53,
F(1, 3) = 280.131, p = .000). No interaction of these two factors was found (F(1, 3) =
1.464, n. s.). “Remember” false alarm rates were not affected by either word frequency
(F(1, 3) = 6.482, n. s.) or Accuracy/Speed bias manipulation (F(1, 3) = .123, n. s.).
High-frequency words received more “know” hits (mean = .30) than low-
frequency words (mean = .20, F(1, 3) = 14.202, p < .05). Accuracy-Speed bias
manipulation did not affect “know” hits (F(1, 3) = 6.019, n. s.). There was no interaction
of the two factors on “know” hit proportion.
“Know” false alarm rates were significantly higher for high-frequency words
(mean = .19) than for low-frequency words (mean = .09, F(1, 3) = 100.347, p < .01), and
were higher in the Speed condition (mean = .16) than in the Accuracy condition (mean
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= .16, F(1, 3) = 13.882, p < .05). No interactions of these two factors were found (F(1, 3)
= .206, n. s.).
2. Remember-know model fits
Overall the ROC data were best accounted for by the extended dual-process
model as is shown in Table 15. Ten out of 16 cases were best fit with the dual-process
models (the standard and the extended versions) and other 5 cases were best fit with the
one-dimensional models (with fixed or variable remember-know criterion). For Subjects
A, B and D, the Speed and Accuracy conditions led different conclusions: The Speed
condition was best fit with the extended dual-process model whereas the Accuracy
condition was best fit with a one-dimensional model except one case (for Subject B with
high-frequency words as stimuli, the dual-process model fit this case best). All four
conditions for Subject C were best fit with the extended dual-process model. Note that
the differences between the model fits were quite small, sometimes less than 1. Therefore
model selection was not compelling.
In Figure 9, the best and worst fit to each condition for Subject A are plotted. In
the Accuracy condition, the variable-criterion one-dimensional model provided best fits
and the dual-process model provided worst fits; in the Speed condition, the extended
dual-process model provided best fits and the dual-process model provided worst fits. For
each condition, the dual-process model misses the first point. The discrepancy between
the dual-process model prediction and the observed data is due to an assumption made by
the dual-process model: “remember” taps recollection and recollection is a high-threshold
process. Therefore the dual-process model predicts a high percentage of “remember”
responses at the highest rating, rating 6. Table 16 shows that, though the dual-process
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model predictions of the proportions of “know” response were similar to other model
predictions or even closer to the observed data than other model predictions, the predicted
“remember” response proportions at rating 6 were larger than what was observed and
what was predicted by other models. Consequently the dual-process model missed the
first point on the observed ROCs of Subject A. Similar situation was found for Subjects C
and D. For Subject C, the extended dual-process model provided best fits and the dual-
process model provided worst fits to the ROC data. As shown in Figure 10, the extended
dual-process model hit the first points on observed ROCs for Subject C, whereas the
predictions of the dual-process model were slightly off. For Subject D, the dual-process
model slightly missed the first point on ROCs whereas the best-fit models hit on the spot.
However, both the best-fit and worst-fit models missed the third and fourth points in the
Accuracy condition for Subject D. The remember-know model fits for Subject B were
quite decent, and also there was not much difference between the best fits and worst fits
as illustrated in Figure 11.
4.2.2 Reaction time analysis
1. Mean RT analyses
Mean reaction time data are shown in Table 17. As in Experiment 1 and 2,
comparisons of mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments were
conducted within subjects with independent two-sample t-tests.
For all four condition for Subject A, C, and D, mean RTs for hits followed by
“remember” judgments were significantly shorter than those followed by “know”
judgments (the smallest tobserved = 3.963, p = .000). For Subject B, in the Accuracy
condition, mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” judgments were shorter than those
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followed by “know” judgments (the smallest tobserved = 4.487, p = .000); however, in the
Speed condition, there was no difference (the largeset tobserved = 1.531, n. s.).
When the confidence was controlled6, 4 tests out of 11 revealed significant
differences (the smallest tobserved = 2.627, p = .010): mean RT was smaller for hits
followed by “remember” judgments than those followed by “know” judgments. These
four conditions were low-frequency words in the Accuracy and the Speed condition for
Subject A, low-frequency words in the Accuracy condition for Subject B, and high-
frequency words in the Speed condition for Subject C. For the other seven tests, the
largest tobserved = 2.003, n. s.. So after controlling the confidence level, the differences
between mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” and “know” disappeared for seven
cases.
2. Distributional RT analysis
The distribution RT analyses were done for RT data collapsed over confidence
ratings and when confidence level was controlled.
The mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” judgments were shorter than
those followed by “know” judgments for all conditions of all subjects except for the
Speed condition of Subject B. As presented in Table 18, the ex-Gaussian distribution fits
showed that the differences in mean RTs could be due to both µ and  parameters (8 out
of 14 cases), µ parameter alone (4 cases), or  parameter alone (1 case). In one condition
(high-frequency words in the Speed condition for Subject D), neither µ or  parameter
values were different for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments. However,
the mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” was shorter than that followed by “know”
6 There are supposed to be 72 t-tests (4 subjects × 2 word frequencies × 3 presentation frequencies × 3 “old” confidence
ratings) in total; however, due to the insufficient number (<10) in most cells, only 11 t-tests were conducted
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judgments. This may be due to the same trend of the difference in µ and  parameters:
both were larger for “know” judgments than for “remember” judgments. In the Speed
condition for Subject B, there were not differences in the mean RTs for hits followed by
“remember” and “know” judgments. Examination of the best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution
parameter values showed that in one case, neither µ or parameter was different for hits
followed by “remember” and “know” judgments. In the other case, there was difference
in theµ parameters whereas the difference was in opposite direction from the difference
in parameters.
Among the four subjects, only Subject A provided enough data for comparison of
best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution parameters for hits followed by “remember” and “know”
judgments when confidence level was controlled. Table 19 showed the parameter values
of the best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution for hits followed by “remember” and “know”
judgments in the four conditions. The results of the mean RT analysis for Subject A at
rating 5 revealed differences in mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” and “know”
judgments for low-frequency words. Examination of the best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution
parameter values showed that the difference for low-frequency words in the Accuracy
condition was due to the  parameter, and the difference in the Speed condition was due
to the µ parameter. This indicated that for low-frequency words, different strategic
processes underlie the “remember” and “know” judgments in the Accuracy condition. In
contrast, the automatic process was different for “remember” and “know” judgments in
the Speed condition, with same underlying strategic process involved in both “remember”
and “know” judgments.
54
Examination of the 95% confidence intervals of the  parameters showed that for
the Accuracy condition with low frequency words as stimuli, the 95% confidence interval
did not include 0, so that  values were different for hits followed by “remember” and
“know” judgments. As discussed in Section 1.5, different  values suggested different
strategic processes underlie “remember” and “know” judgments, which supported the
dual-process model. For other three conditions, the 95% confidence intervals included 0,
so that  parameter values were similar for hits followed by “remember” and “know”
judgments, thus supporting the one-dimensional models.
Figure 13 illustrates the RT distributions for hits followed by “remember” and
“know” judgments with high-frequency words as stimuli in the Accuracy and Speed
conditions for Subject A. The best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution is superimposed on each
empirical distribution. Figure 14 illustrates analogous data with low frequency words as
stimuli. As is expected, in the Accuracy condition, because the subjects had sufficient
time to engage strategic processes, the skews of the RT distributions are larger than those
in the Speed condition.
4.3 Discussion
The remember-know model fit results showed that the extended dual-process
model provided best fits for 10 out of 16 cases and the dual-process model fit one case
best; the one-dimensional model fit one case best and the one-dimensional model with
variable remember-know criterion fit 4 cases best. The remember-know model fit results
indicated that recollection is not an “all-or-none” threshold process, since the dual-
process model only fit one case best, and all the other models assume a continuous
recollection process.
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The mean RTs generally replicated Dewhurst et al. (2006): the mean RT for hits
followed by “remember” was faster than “know” judgments, except for the Speed
condition for one subject. When reaction times were analyzed separately for each
confidence rating, the differences in mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” and
“know” judgments disappeared for seven cases.
Examination of the best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution parameter values without
controlling confidence level revealed that the differences in the mean RTs for hits
followed by “remember” and “know” judgments could be due to both µ and
 parameters, µ parameter alone, or  parameter alone.
Only Subject A provided enough data for ex-Gaussian distribution fit when
confidence level was controlled. For three out of four conditions, there was no difference
between the best-fit values of the parameter for hits followed by “remember” and
“know” responses, which indicated that same strategic process underlies the “remember”
and “know” responses and thus supported the one-dimensional models. For another
condition, low-frequency words in the Accuracy condition, the difference between
 values of hits followed by “remember” and “know” responses was significant.
Different  values suggested that “remember” and “know” judgments engaged different
strategic processes and therefore supported the dual-process model.
The conclusions from ex-Gaussian distribution fits were not consistent with the
remember-know model fits. The remember-know model fit results showed that the one-
dimensional model with variable remember-know criterion provided best fits for the
Accuracy condition for Subject A and the extended dual-process model provided best fits
for the Speed condition for Subject A. Therefore, only in the Accuracy condition with
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high-frequency words as stimuli, the remember-know model fit and the ex-Gaussian
distribution fit provided convergent evidence: the one-dimensional model provided best
account for the data. In the other conditions, the results of the remember-know model fit
contradicted the results of the ex-Gaussian distribution fit.
As pointed out in the remember-know model fit results section, the differences of
AIC values between the one-dimensional model and the dual-process models were quite
small. The average difference in the AIC values of the one-dimensional model and the
dual-process model was 12. Whether such small difference could determine the best-fit
model remains a question. Meanwhile, the 95% confidence intervals of the difference in
the  parameter values for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments were
wide, which caused uncertainty about the difference values of the  parameter for hits
followed by “remember” and “know” judgments.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
5.1 Summary of the experiments
Remember-know paradigm has been extensively used to investigate recognition
memory. Five remember-know models have been proposed to explain the data. Since all
the responses are made over time, both response accuracy and response time data should
be accounted for by the true model. Therefore, in this thesis, both response accuracy data
and reaction time data were used to evaluate the performance of the five remember-know
models.
Three experiments were conducted with broadly used manipulations. For the
response accuracy data from each experiment, the five remember-know models were fit
to the ROC data and AIC statistics were used to compare the performance across the
models. Ex-Gaussian distribution was fit to reaction times of hits followed by
“remember” and “know” responses when confidence level is controlled. The best-fit
values of the  parameter were used to examine whether the underlying strategic
processes are same or not.
The remember-know model fits showed prominent individual differences and
condition differences. Overall, Experiment 1 supported the one-dimensional model: the
one-dimensional model (or the one-dimensional model with variable remember-know
criterion) provided best fits to the ROC data for 6 out of 8 subject-condition
combinations. The RT distributions also implied that the one-dimensional model could
better account for the data. For Subject A and Subject D who provided enough data to fit
ex-Gaussian distribution to both hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments
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when controlled for confidence ratings, the similar  values indicated that the same
strategic processes underlie the two responses, which is consistent with the one-
dimensional models.
The remember-know model fit results of Experiment 2 were mixed. Two subjects’
ROC data were best fit with the one-dimensional SDT model with variable remember-
know criterion and one subject was best fit with the dual-process model. There were not
enough data for distributional data analysis when confidence level was controlled.
In Experiment 3, the Accuracy condition for Subjects A, B and D were best fit
with the one-dimensional model with fixed or variable remember-know criterion with
one exception: The Accuracy condition with high frequency stimuli for Subject B was
best fit with the dual-process model. In contrast, the Speed condition for Subjects A, B
and D were best fit with the extended dual-process model (except for one case). Subject
C was consistently best fit with the extended dual-process model. The differences in AIC
statistics between models were quite small, and so model selection was not compelling.
The distributional RT analysis results were mixed. In three conditions, similar  values
were found for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments, and thus supported
the one-dimensional models. In one condition,  values were different for hits followed
by “remember” and “know” judgments, which supported the dual-process models.
In summary, the three experiments provided mixed results for model evaluation.
The remember-know model fit results (except for two subject-condition combinations)
and distributional RT analysis results in Experiment 1 provided convergent evidence that
supported the one-dimensional models. The remember-know model fit results in
Experiment 2 were mixed: two subjects were best fit with the one-dimensional models
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and one subject was best fit with the dual-process models. The remember-know model
fits in Experiment 3 favored the extended dual-process model, whereas the distributional
RT analyses favored the one-dimensional models.
The current study confirmed that mean RT is not a reliable measure. Same mean
RTs could come from different shaped distributions and conclusions based on mean RTs
overlook the useful distributional information and could be misleading. Take an example
from Experiment 2. For the low-frequency words presented five times for Subject D,
there was no difference in the mean RTs for hits followed by “remember” and “know”.
However, examination of the best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution parameter values showed
that both the µ and  parameters were significantly different. However, since µ and
 parameters were different in opposite directions and mean RT equals the sum of µ and
 , there was not difference in mean RTs.
If conclusion is drawn based on same mean RTs, it could be claimed that same
process underlies manipulation levels A and B. However, this is not true if the RT
distributions for the two manipulation levels are different. Therefore, the ex-Gaussian
distribution provides a more accurate and informative approach for reaction time data
analysis than mean RTs, and should be used more often in research that involves RT data
analysis.
5.2 Implications for the remember-know models
The one-dimensional models provided the best account for the ROC data for two
subjects and the Long condition for the other two subjects in Experiment 1, two out of
three subjects in Experiment 2, and the Accuracy condition for three subjects (except for
one case) in Experiment 3.
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The one-dimensional models assume that in the remember-know paradigm same
qualitative process underlies “remember” and “know” responses, and the only difference
is that the criterion for “remember” responses is higher than that for “know” responses
(Donaldson, 1996; Wixted & Stretch, 2004). Projecting this assumption onto reaction
time data analysis, one dimensional SDT model predicts that similar  parameter values
of the best fit ex-Gaussian distribution for hit followed by “remember” and “know”
judgments, because similar  parameter values suggest similar strategic processes
involved in the task. This prediction was confirmed in Experiment 1: when confidence
level was controlled, no difference was found in the  values for hits followed by
“remember” and “know” responses. In Experiment 3, when confidence level was
controlled, in three out of four conditions for Subject A, no difference was found in
 values, although in the Accuracy condition with low frequency words as stimuli, the
 values are significantly different for hits followed by “remember” and “know” .
The dual-process models provided best fits for the ROC data in Short condition
for two subjects in Experiment 1, one subject in Experiment 2 and one subject in
Experiment 3 as well as the Speed condition for all four subjects.
The dual-process model assumes that “remember” responses tap recollection and
“know” responses tap familiarity. Recollection is a high threshold process while
familiarity works according to an equal variance SDT model (Yonelinas et al., 1996).
Therefore, “remember” and “know” are two qualitatively different processes with
qualitatively different information engaged. Projecting this onto reaction times, the dual-
process models predict that  parameter in the ex-Gaussian distribution should have
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different values for hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments. This is
supported by one condition for Subject A in Experiment 3.
In some conditions where the dual-process model provided inferior fits to other
models, it was due to that the dual-process model predicts a high percentage of
“remember” responses at the highest confidence rating, which was not consistent with
what was observed. However, the dual-process model did provide best fit for the ROC
data of some subjects. This suggested that for some subjects in certain conditions,
“remember” judgments were based on a high-threshold process.
STREAK provided poor fit for most data except for one case in Experiment 2
presumably because “remember” and “know” judgments were highly correlated with the
“old/new” confidence ratings (the average correlation between the “remember” response
rates and the “old” confidence ratings is .99), which is not predicted by STREAK.
5.3 Challenges confronting the current study
Inconsistencies were found in the remember-know model fits and the ex-Gaussian
distribution fits. In Experiment 1, Subject D was best fit with the dual-process model.
However, the ex-Gaussian distribution fit to the reaction time of hits followed by
“remember” and “know” at confidence rating 5 shows that the strategic process indicator,
 , was similar for hits followed by “remember” and “know” and therefore supported the
one-dimensional models. Similar contradictory situation was found for Subject A in the
third experiment. The Speed condition for Subject A was best fit by the extended dual-
process model, whereas the  parameter values were not different for hits followed by
“remember” and “know” and therefore supported the one-dimensional models. The
Accuracy condition for Subject A was best fit by the one-dimensional model with
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variable remember-know criterion. For high-frequency words in the Accuracy condition,
the  parameter values were not different and supported the one-dimensional models,
providing consistent evidence with the remember-know model fit. For low-frequency
words in the Accuracy condition,  values were significantly different for hits followed
by “remember” and “know” and therefore supported the dual-process models,
inconsistent with the remember-know model fit.
One possible explanation is that the differences in AIC statistics for the
remember-know model fits were too small to claim real differences. Therefore, the 
parameter values of ex-Gaussian distribution provide more reliable evidence for model
evaluation. Another possibility is that the reaction times were contaminated by lapses of
attention due to the fatigue of the subjects. Such contamination changed the parameter
values of the best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution, especially  since there would be more
outliers contributing to the tail of the distribution. Therefore for contaminated data, the
difference in the  parameter values is no long a reliable index of the strategic processes
of “remember” and “know” judgments.
5.4 Future research directions
The common issue for the current three experiments is that none of them provided
enough data to do the reaction time data analysis when confidence is controlled.
Therefore, to design an experiment that can accomplish this goal is the next step.
One attempt is to dissociate confidence ratings with “remember/know” judgments
since the subjects may always give “remember” judgment for items that receive high
confidence ratings and give “know” judgment for items that receive low confidence
ratings. If during the test, the subjects make confidence ratings in the first test phase and
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then make “remember/know” judgments in the second test phase in which the same test
items are presented randomly, “remember” and “know” responses may be correlated with
common confidence ratings more often.
Another attempt is to utilize a continuum of confidence ratings instead of six
discrete intervals. Chance to obtain an overlapping range of confidence level related to
both “remember” and “know” judgments is much larger.
In addition to using different experiment design, distributional RT data analysis
can be conducted with different reaction time models. The diffusion model is one good
option since it is capable of investigating response bias and accuracy-speed tradeoff. The
diffusion model has been applied in various two-choice tasks such as perception,
recognition memory and lexical decision and successfully accounted for the relationship
between reaction time distribution and response accuracy (Ratcliff, 2004). In the
diffusion model, information accumulation process begins from the starting point and
stops until the amount of accumulated information reaches either the positive or the
negative response boundary and therefore a decision was made. Response time equals the
time of accumulation process plus a constant encoding and decision-execution time. To
explicate the mechanism that underlies the cognitive tasks, the diffusion model fits the
probabilities of the correct and errors responses at their five quantile7 reaction times in
each condition.
To understand “remember” and “know” judgments with the diffusion model, five
quantiles are needed for hits, misses, correct rejections and false alarms. However, for the
current three experiments, due to the extremely low “remember” false alarm rates, there
7 A quantile means the fraction (or percent) of data below the given value. For example, the .1 (or 10%) quantile is the
point at which 30% percent of the data fall below and 70% fall above that value.
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was not enough data to calculate five quantiles for “remember” false alarms. In addition,
diffusion model required that subjects only made a single attempt to complete the two-
choice task, which generally takes less than 1 second. However, in the current three
experiments, reaction times exceeding 1 s were quite common. Therefore it is not
appropriate to use diffusion model to interpret the reaction data for our experiments. If
subjects receive training to make responses quickly within 1s before the formal
experiment, diffusion model could provide insights into the “remember” and “know”
judgments.
To evaluate the remember-know model with RT distributions of “remember” and
“know” judgments, another attempt is to compare the predicted distributions from a
specific remember-know model with the observed distributions. Each remember-know
model has definite predictions on response accuracy which make it feasible to compare
their performances in fitting ROC data. Meanwhile, it is possible to infer reaction time
distributions of “remember” and “know” responses from these models. To simulate the
distributions from the predictions of the three models and then compare them with the
real RT data distributions will give us some hints whether these models have the potential
to predict the correct reaction time distributions for “remember” and “know” responses.
5.5 Conclusions
Three experiments were conducted to evaluate the remember-know models from
response accuracy and reaction time data. Overall, the one-dimensional model provided
best account for the response accuracy data. In most conditions, no difference was found
in the skew parameter values of the best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution to the reaction times
of hits followed by “remember” and “know” judgments. Same skew parameter values
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suggested that same strategic process underlie “remember” and “know” judgments. This
is consistent with the assumption of the signal detection models.
Individual difference and condition difference were found in the remember-know
model fit results, suggesting that different subjects could use different encoding or
retrieval strategies and for different tasks.
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Table 1. The z-ROC slopes and ad values of the Long and Short conditions for each
subject in Experiment 1.
Subject List length ad z-ROC slope
long 1.34 0.70A
short 1.77 0.52
long 1.79 0.53B
short 2.30 0.59
long 0.75 0.63C
short 1.33 0.67
long 1.63 0.69D
short 2.55 0.67
long 1.18 0.54Overall
short 1.75 0.53
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Table 2. Overall “remember/know” proportion for old and new words in the Long and
Short conditions in Experiment 1.
ProportionWord type List length Remember Know
Long 0.40 0.31Old
Short 0.51 0.31
Long 0.03 0.17New
Short 0.02 0.12
68
Table 3. AIC values for the fits of each remember-know model for each subject in the
Long and Short conditions of Experiment 1. “Extended one-dimensional” denotes the
one-dimensional model with variable remember-know criterion. The shading number is
the smallest number in each row, and therefore it indicates the best fit in that condition.
Model
Subject Condition One-
dimensional
Extended
one-
dimensional
Dual-
process
Extended
dual-
process
STREAK
Long 4474 4419 4576 4430 4963A
Short 4454 4399 4640 4407 5022
Long 4037 4123 4087 4073 4613B
Short 3485 3507 3478 3482 3973
Long 3310 3342 3438 3327 3588C
Short 3304 3341 3340 3317 3742
Long 4877 4863 4868 4866 5092D Short 4219 4201 4187 4190 4395
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Table 4. The observed response proportions and predicted proportions for “remember”
and “know” judgments across three “old” confidence ratings in Long and Short condition
for Subject A (best fit by extended one-dimensional model), Short condition for Subject
B and D (best fit by dual-process model) in Experiment 1. For the Short conditions for
Subject B and Subject D, the “remember” judgments mostly concentrated at confidence
rating 6. “Ext One-dim” denotes the one-dimensional model with variable remember-
know criterion.
Response
“Remember” “Know”Subject Conditions Models
6 5 4 6 5 4
observed 0.811 0.189 0.000 0.000 0.287 0.713
Ext One-dim
predicted 0.817 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.285 0.715Long
Dual-process
predicted 0.980 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.267 0.733
observed 0.799 0.201 0.000 0.000 0.347 0.653
Ext One-dim
predicted 0.805 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.348 0.652
A
Short
Dual-process
predicted 0.980 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.338 0.662
observed 0.988 0.009 0.004 0.000 0.512 0.488
Ext One-dim
predicted 0.969 0.030 0.000 0.037 0.622 0.341B Short
Dual-process
predicted 0.980 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.557 0.443
Observed 0.983 0.010 0.007 0.533 0.219 0.248
Ext One-dim
predicted 0.953 0.024 0.024 0.522 0.220 0.258D Short
Dual-process
predicted 0.980 0.010 0.010 0.512 0.218 0.270
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Table 5. Mean reaction times (in ms) for hits and false alarms followed by “remember”
and “know” judgments at each confidence rating in the Long and Short conditions of
Experiment 1. “RT” means mean reaction time and the numbers in the parentheses are
standard errors of the mean RTs. N indicates the number of observations that contributed
to the mean RTs.
Item Type
Old New
Remember Know Remember Know
Confidence
level
List
length
RT N RT N RT N RT N
Long 913
(12) 1140
1096
(15) 860
1427
(119) 76
1284
(27) 470
All “old”
responses
Short 833
(24) 1433
1020
(15) 860
1191
(68) 40
1276
(30) 333
Long 886
(11) 1061
983
(25) 136
1295
(170) 50
1035
(198) 9
6
Short 828
(25) 1356
852
(19) 187
1054
(65) 28
1074
(112) 3
Long 1156
(58) 62
1100
(26) 263
1630
(146) 11
1402
(65) 96
5
Short 909
(23) 70
1027
(31) 273
1514
(173) 7
1212
(67) 64
Long 1657
(180) 17
1128
(22) 461
1720
(165) 15
1259
(29) 365
4
Short 1051
(152) 7
1094
(22) 400
1503
(216) 5
1293
(33) 266
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Table 6. The parameter values of best-fit ex-Gaussian for hits followed by “remember”
and “know” responses in the Long and Short conditions for the four subjects collapsed
over all “old” ratings, for Subject A at rating 5, and for Subject D at rating 6 in
Experiment 1.
Subject Condition Remember/Know Mean SD µ  
Remember 882 212 679 60 203
Long Know 964 285 700 108 264
Remember 823 180 647 39 176
A
Short Know 908 243 679 82 229
Remember 873 324 550 34 322Long Know 1380 585 805 110 575
Remember 1188 780 409 38 779B Short Know 1391 729 668 96 723
Remember 972 353 622 50 349Long Know 1213 499 722 92 491
Remember 814 226 595 54 220C Short Know 1111 414 701 52 411
Remember 981 313 669 26 312Long Know 1127 401 732 71 395
Remember 886 261 628 37 258D Short Know 1011 375 638 38 373
Remember 970 245 734 64 236long Know 998 276 742 105 256
Remember 918 205 728 78 190A/5 Short Know 862 190 691 81 171
Remember 971 304 669 26 302Long Know 977 286 695 47 283
Remember 881 255 628 37 253D/6 Short Know 850 223 629 33 221
Table 7. Confidence intervals (95%) for the differences in best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution parameters for hits followed by
“remember” and “know” responses for the four subjects collapsed over all “old” ratings, for Subject A at confidence rating 5, and for
Subject D at confidence rating 6 in Experiment 1. “R” represents “remember” judgments and “K” represents “know” judgments.
Sample size µ 95%CI  95%CI  95%CISubject/
confidence
level
List
length R K KR µµ  Lower
bound
Upper
bound
KR   Lower
bound
Upper
bound
KR   Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Long 179 353 -20.9 -61.2 22.7 -47.7 -79.3 -19.2 -61.4 -121.0 -4.2A Short 262 329 -32.1 -61.6 -1.7 -42.6 -64.3 -19.3 -53.1 -95.5 -9.2
Long 532 98 -255.0 -311.0 -189.5 -76.0 -117.3 -12.8 -252.7 -426.3 -97.6B Short 571 85 -259.7 -320.8 -89.1 -57.8 -134.4 39.3 56.4 -679.3 206.6
Long 207 82 -100.0 -160.6 -33.2 -42.2 -74.8 8.1 -141.4 -298.7 8.7C Short 304 105 -105.9 -154.1 -53.1 2.5 -27.9 52.8 -191.4 -287.4 -89.7
Long 222 327 -62.6 -94.8 -27.2 -45.4 -70.6 -16 -82.9 -157.9 -15.6D
Short 296 341 -9.8 -34.9 13.9 -1.0 -19.2 17.7 -114.7 -177.8 -54.7
Long 34 102 -8.0 -92.0 139.7 -40.5 -104.8 81.6 -19.6 -185.5 108.6A/5 Short 53 113 37.2 -56.1 112.5 -3.5 -79.1 55.3 18.6 -71.1 128.9
Long 214 134 -25.8 -63.1 4.6 -21.0 -52.5 10.5 20.0 -55.3 95.1D/6 Short 291 185 -0.8 -25.8 20.4 4.6 -11.8 22.9 31.7 -24.0 87.1
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Table 8. The ad values and zslopes in each condition (word frequency × presentation frequency)
for the four subjects in Experiment 2.
Presentation frequency
1 3 5Subject
Word
frequency
ad z-slope ad z-slope ad z-slope
High 1.89 0.28 3.00 0.35 3.96 0.97A Low 3.04 0.72 3.67 0.89 4.36 2.08
High 1.36 0.57 1.37 0.61 2.26 0.51B Low 1.91 0.65 2.23 0.62 2.65 0.84
High 1.41 0.63 2.16 0.61 2.87 0.66C Low 1.56 0.35 2.17 0.34 3.27 0.50
High 1.08 0.82 1.49 0.96 1.84 0.72D Low 1.67 0.65 2.48 0.78 2.54 0.59
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Table 9. Response proportions of “know” and “remember” judgments in each condition (high
frequency/low frequency, presentation frequency 1/3/5/0) for old and new words in Experiment
2.
Response
Word type Word
Frequency
Presentation
frequency
“Remember” “Know”
High 0.47 0.22
Low
1
0.55 0.21
High 0.55 0.26
Low
3
0.67 0.22
High 0.68 0.25
Old
low
5
0.75 0.20
High 0.02 0.15
New
Low
0
0.01 0.06
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Table 10. AIC values of the remember-know model fits to each condition for three subjects in
Experiment 2. The shading number in each row indicates the best fit. “DP” denotes the dual-
process model; “DP-ext” denotes the extended dual-process model: “One-dim” denotes the one-
dimensional model and “one-dim ext” represents the one-dimensional model with variable
remember-know criterion.
Remember-know models
Subject Wordfrequency
Presentation
frequency One-dim One-dim ext DP DP-ext STREAK
1 2009 1987 1973 1974 2236
3 2003 1979 1968 1971 2268High
5 1812 1789 1783 1784 2011
1 1975 1953 1949 1946 2215
3 1879 1856 1850 1852 2067
B
Low
5 1774 1751 1748 1749 1960
1 1610 1597 1763 1612 1992
3 1460 1447 1587 1476 1366High
5 1313 1301 1419 1337 1559
1 1031 1020 1062 1041 1301
3 944 933 980 952 1723
C
Low
5 800 784 825 811 939
1 1860 1836 1840 1841 1908
3 1813 1789 1787 1790 1731High
5 1822 1800 1812 1815 1910
1 1787 1762 1781 1783 1874
3 1740 1716 1743 1723 1957
D
Low
5 1701 1680 1701 1701 1845
Table 11. The numbers in the parentheses are the SEs of the mean RTs. “Rating” means confidence rating.
Presentation frequency
0 1 3 5
Remember Know Remember Know Remember Know Remember Know
Word
frequency/
rating
RT N RT N RT N RT N RT N RT N RT N RT N
High/
overall
895
(108) 35
1105
(22) 302
671
(10) 315
1105
(30) 147
658
(12) 357
1062
(23) 173
656
(13) 452
1115
(45) 168
High/6 738(53) 16 710 1
655
(9) 289 -- 0
649
(12) 338 -- 0
644
(10) 438 1078 1
High/5 1187(375) 5
965
(21) 79
818
(80) 13
970
(39) 57
833
(60) 12
956
(20) 79
760
(63) 10
1022
(71) 85
High/4 971(228) 14
1157
(29) 222
894
(93) 13
1190
(39) 90
789
(145) 7
1151
(38) 94
1664
(862) 4
1211
(54) 82
Low/
overall
940
(73) 17
1209
(41) 120
707
(11) 362
1197
(37) 134
713
(10) 429
1176
(33) 142
670
(10) 506
1050
(25) 131
Low/6 998(98) 12 -- 0
694
(10) 349 694 1
706
(11) 412 -- 0
668
(10) 494 1018 1
Low/5 910 1 1012(27) 36
905
(117) 7
1040
(26) 66
888
(31) 10
1012
(22) 78
757
(60) 11
985
(23) 91
Low/4 774(54) 4
1293
(55) 84
1255
(229) 6
1360
(64) 67
845
(124) 7
1375
(58) 64 538 1
1202
(58) 39
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Table 12. Confidence intervals for the differences in best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution parameters for hits followed by “remember” and
“know” responses in Experiment 2. For Subject B, the conditions that provided enough data (>40) are high-frequency words presented
once, three times, five times, and low-frequency words presented once; for Subject D, the conditions that provided enough data are
low-frequency words presented three times and five times. “PF” denotes “presentation frequency”. “HF” denotes “high-frequency”
and “LF” denotes “low-frequency”. “R” represents “remember” judgments and “K” represents “know” judgments.
Sample size µ 95%CI  95%CI  95%CISubject/
Word
frequency
PF R K KR µµ  Lowerbound
Upper
bound
KR   Lower
bound
Upper
bound
KR   Lower
bound
Upper
bound
1 77 60 -222.8 -318.4 -168.4 -40.6 -97.7 1.2 31.5 -53.3 145.1
3 71 67 -193.9 -315.4 -148.0 21.7 -71.8 64.6 -12.1 -78.4 98.3B/HF
5 122 42 -205.8 -373.7 -166.4 -15.5 -112.5 33.6 -14.3 -86.6 162.8
B/LF 1 101 36 -261.5 -402.6 -184.7 -34.2 -109.0 36.0 -10.2 -98.7 115.4
3 35 113 29.8 -51.5 116.0 2.6 -65.0 63.3 -202.8 -362.6 -33.5D/LF
5 45 107 85.6 21.4 201.6 57.1 -7.1 130.6 -159.4 -281.0 -73.177
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Table 13. The ad values and zslopes in Accuracy and Speed condition for high and low-
frequency words for each subject in Experiment 3.
Subject Wordfrequency Condition ad zslope
Accuracy 2.07 0.70High Speed 1.50 0.66
Accuracy 2.97 0.51A Low Speed 2.69 0.67
Accuracy 1.01 0.89High Speed 0.67 0.89
Accuracy 1.66 0.60B Low Speed 1.43 0.82
Accuracy 2.68 0.89High Speed 2.31 0.92
Accuracy 3.35 0.82C Low Speed 2.63 0.88
Accuracy 1.52 0.49High Speed 1.37 0.53
Accuracy 2.61 0.39D Low Speed 2.32 0.51
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Table 14. Proportions of hits and false alarms followed by “remember” or “know”
judgments in each condition of Experiment 3.
Response proportionWord type Wordfrequency Condition Remember Know
Accuracy 0.474 0.315High Speed 0.421 0.277
Accuracy 0.667 0.216Old Low Speed 0.632 0.188
Accuracy 0.010 0.172High Speed 0.006 0.203
Accuracy 0.002 0.067New Low Speed 0.004 0.109
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Table 15. AIC values of the remember-know model fits in Experiment 3. Small values
(the shading numbers) indicate better fits. “One-dim” denotes the one-dimensional model
and “one-dim ext” represents the one-dimensional model with variable remember-know
criterion. “DP” denotes the dual-process model; “DP-ext” denotes the extended dual-
process model:
Model
Subject Wordfrequency Condition One-dim
One-dim
ext DP DP-ext STREAK
Accuracy 2666 2652 2904 2662 2801High Speed 2852 2844 3202 2820 3143
Accuracy 1828 1808 2014 1820 2058A Low Speed 2046 2064 2256 2040 2315
Accuracy 2716 2704 2697.5 2698.3 3000High Speed 2540 2516 2522 2514 2748
Accuracy 2581 2570 2579 2579 3014B Low Speed 2536 2540 2528 2512 2926
Accuracy 2108 2092 2174 2086 2426High Speed 2362 2368 2478 2346 2815
Accuracy 1688 1680 1708 1678 1923C Low Speed 2060 2056 2110 2052 2416
Accuracy 2258 2266 2404 2292 2994High Speed 2484 2486 2578 2458 2835
Accuracy 1652 1632 1724 1642 1970D Low Speed 1694 1676 1774 1672 2055
Table 16. The observed response proportions and predicted proportions for “remember” and “know” judgments across three “old”
confidence ratings 4, 5 and 6 in four conditions for Subject A in Experiment 3. “WF” denotes “word frequency”, “HF” denotes high-
frequency and “LF” denotes low-frequency. “Ext One-dim” denotes the one-dimensional model with variable remember-know
criterion and “Ext dual-process” denotes the extended dual-process model. In each condition, the dual-process model provided worst
fit and one-dimensional model or variable-criterion one-dimensional model provided best fit.
Response
“Remember” “Know”Subject WF/Condition Observation/modelprediction 6 5 4 6 5 4
Observed 0.805 0.189 0.007 0.000 0.620 0.380
Ext One-dim predicted 0.797 0.198 0.004 0.005 0.597 0.398HF/Accuracy
Dual-process predicted 0.980 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.564 0.436
Observed 0.594 0.377 0.029 0.000 0.480 0.520
Ext dual-process predicted 0.594 0.377 0.029 0.000 0.412 0.588HF/Speed
Dual-process predicted 0.980 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.412 0.588
Observed 0.842 0.158 0.000 0.029 0.632 0.338
Ext One-dim predicted 0.860 0.135 0.005 0.016 0.646 0.338LF/Accuracy
Dual-process predicted 0.980 0.010 0.010 0.029 0.619 0.352
Observed 0.822 0.175 0.003 0.032 0.587 0.381
Ext dual-process predicted 0.822 0.175 0.003 0.069 0.477 0.454
A
LF/Speed
Dual-process predicted 0.980 0.010 0.010 0.069 0.477 0.454
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Table 17. Mean RTs of “old” responses and the sample size followed by “remember” and “know” judgments in Accuracy and Speed
conditions with high and low frequency words as stimuli in Experiment 3. The numbers in the parentheses are the SEs of the mean
RTs.
Item Type
Old NewConfidencelevel
Word
frequency Condition Remember N Know N Remember N Know N
Accuracy 884(18) 648 1386(247) 11 997(82) 7 1818(392) 5High Speed 635(7) 539 719(208) 4 661(90) 6 631 1
Accuracy 836(14) 989 1315(146) 21 962 1 1745(611) 46 Low Speed 647(5) 896 691(44) 3 723(87) 5 641(100) 4
Accuracy 1091(49) 115 1223(52) 235 1347(536) 2 1490(192) 51High Speed 710(16) 141 673(12) 181 681(105) 5 708(27) 52
Accuracy 983(36) 98 1204(42) 188 1102(171) 2 1383(105) 15
5
Low Speed 722(16) 128 717(15) 146 761 1 719(40) 26
Accuracy 1584(158) 10 1523(52) 270 1877(396) 8 1698(80) 228High Speed 882(99) 13 768(18) 266 -- 0 758(14) 273
Accuracy 1337(206) 2 1438(54) 143 -- 0 1553(94) 914 Low Speed 809(77) 8 724(20) 155 -- 0 728(21) 144
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Table 18. 95% CIs for the differences of ex-Gaussian parameters for hits followed by “remember” and “know” in Experiment 3. “A”
represents the Accuracy condition and “S” represents the Speed condition. “R” represents “remember” judgments and “K” represents
“know” judgments.
Sample size µ 95%CI  95%CI  95%CISubject/
confidenc
e level
WF/
Condition R K KR µµ  Lowerbound
Upper
bound
KR   Lower
bound
Upper
bound
KR   Lower
bound
Upper
bound
HF/A 195 136 -103 -151 38 -31 -74 55 -431 -778 -197
HF/S 175 127 -72 -118 -21 -32 -55 -5 -50 -135 17
LF/A 302 67 -138 -315 -15 -72 -154 49 -275 -551 49
A
LF/S 314 63 -162 -274 -85 -61 -108 -7 19 -54 123
HF/A 61 207 -107 -178 -11 -37 -112 35 -159 -107 -178
HF/S 39 150 89 4 184 2 -57 45 -54 -141 29
LF/A 156 155 -102 -167 -43 -52 -104 0 -236 -102 -167
B
LF/S 121 133 38 -22 92 -24 -68 13 -29 -92 44
HF/A 272 103 -126 -225 -10 -105 -169 23 -216 -360 -94
HF/S 271 111 -44 -74 -17 -26 -51 2 -60 -102 -16
LF/A 302 79 -133 -225 -37 -72 -121 36 -173 -323 -45
C
LF/S 307 69 -22 -116 -12 26 -55 32 -115 -141 -10
HF/A 241 65 -306 -452 -244 -4 -148 61 -344 -558 -101
HF/S 198 62 -78 -217 16 -92 -178 -16 -104 -225 54
LF/A 323 50 -236 -389 -87 -158 -247 -32 -522 -870 -220
D
LF/S 282 39 -292 -381 -122 -204 -265 -103 110 -42 131
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Table 19. 95% Confidence intervals for the differences of best-fit ex-Gaussian distribution parameters of hits followed by “remember”
and “know” responses for Subject A at confidence rating 5 in Experiment 3. “A” represents the Accuracy condition and “S” represents
the Speed condition. “R” represents “remember” judgments and “K” represents “know” judgments.
Sample size µ 95%CI  95%CI  95%CISubject/
Confidence
level
WF/
Condition
R K KR µµ  Lowerbound
Upper
bound
KR   Lower
bound
Upper
bound
KR   Lower
bound
Upper
bound
HF/A 54 83 -15.0 -89.0 155.5 35.2 -33.5 92.5 -221.2 -634 19.7
HF/S 66 61 -67.9 -142.0 -0.2 -45.2 -90.3 -9.0 73.8 -3.8 158.7
LF/A 47 43 46.4 -55.1 131.1 9.8 -74.7 77.2 -455.9 -735.2 -151.7A/5
LF/S 54 36 -113.0 -239.6 -12.0 -48.5 -115.3 32.1 24.2 -81.6 142.1
84 
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Figure 1. The one-dimensional SDT model . Old and new items differ in average strength
and two criteria are used to determine responses. Observations above the old criterion
receive “old” responses and those below the old criterion receive “new” responses;
observations above the remember criterion lead to “remember” responses while the
observations between the two criteria lead to “know” responses.
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Figure 2. The STREAK model from Rotello et al. (2004). Old and new items differ in
both specific and global strength. One decision bound distinguishes “old” from “new”
responses on the basis of the weighted sum of the two axes; a second bound distinguishes
“remember” from “know” responses on the basis of a weighted difference. Circles
represent equal-likelihood contours from bivariate distributions.
xd = diagnosticity of
global information;
yd = diagnosticity of specific information; oC =distance of the old-new
decision bound from the mean of the New distribution;
rC =distance of the remember-
know decision bound from the mean of the Old distribution.
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Figure 3. (a) Two ex-Gaussian distributions with the same mean (mean=1.1) but different
variance (0.13 and 0.5 respectively); (b) Two ex-Gaussian distributions with the same
mean (mean=1.0) and variance (variance=0.10); (c) Two ex-Gaussian distributions with
different means (1.1 and 1.3 respectively); (d) Two ex-Gaussian distributions with
different means (1.5 and 1.1) because of difference in the size of the tails.
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Figure 4. Illustration of the best and worst remember-know model fits to the response
accuracy data in the Long and Short conditions for Subject A and in the Short condition
for Subject B and D in Experiment 1. The upper left panel illustrates the fits to the Long
condition of Subject A. The upper right panel illustrates the fits to the Short condition of
Subject A. The bottom left panel illustrates the fits to the Short condition of Subject B
and the bottom right panel illustrates the fits to the Short condition of Subject D. In Long
and Short conditions for Subject A, the variable remember-know criterion one-
dimensional model provided best fits and the dual-process model provided worst fits. For
the Short condition of Subject B and D, the dual-process model provided best fits, and
one-dimensional model or one-dimensional model with variable remember-know
criterion provided worst fits. However, all the model fits are decent.
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Figure 5. Reaction time distributions for hits followed by “remember” (top row) or
“know” judgments (bottom row) in the Long List condition, separately for Subject A (left
column) and D (right column) in Experiment 1. Subject A’s data are shown for
confidence level 5; subject D’s data are shown for confidence level 6. In all panels, the
empirical data are shown as a histogram and the best-fitting ex-Gaussian distribution is
superimposed with a solid contour. Parameters of the ex-Gaussian are shown.
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Figure 6. Reaction time distributions for hits followed by “remember” (top row) or
“know” judgments (bottom row) in the Short List condition, separately for Subject A (left
column) and D (right column) in Experiment 1. Subject A’s data are shown for
confidence level 5; subject D’s data are shown for confidence level 6. In all panels, the
empirical data are shown as a histogram and the best-fitting ex-Gaussian distribution is
superimposed with a solid contour. Parameters of the ex-Gaussian are shown.
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Figure 7. Reaction time distributions for hits followed by “remember” (top row) or
“know” judgments (bottom row) for Subject B in Experiment 2, separately for high-
frequency condition (left column) and low-frequency condition (right column) presented
once. In all panels, the empirical data are shown as a histogram and the best-fitting ex-
Gaussian distribution is superimposed with a solid contour. Parameters of the ex-
Gaussian are shown.
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Figure 8. Reaction time distributions for hits followed by “remember” (top row) or
“know” judgments (bottom row) in low-frequency word condition for Subject D in
Experiment 2, separately for presentation frequency as 3 (left column) and 5 (right
column). In all panels, the empirical data are shown as a histogram and the best-fitting
ex-Gaussian distribution is superimposed with a solid contour. Parameters of the ex-
Gaussian are shown.
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Figure 9. The fits of remember-know models to Subject A in Experiment 3, where “one-
dim ext” represents the one-dimensional SDT model with variable remember-know
criterion, “DP” represents the dual-process model and “DP ext” represents the extended
dual-process model. Each panel illustrates the best and worst fit models for that
condition. Circles illustrate the best fits and triangles illustrate the worst fits. Panel (A)
illustrates the fits to high frequency words in Accuracy condition. Panel (B) illustrates the
fits to high frequency words in Speed condition. Panel (C) illustrates the fits to low
frequency words in Accuracy condition and Panel (D) illustrates the fits to low frequency
words in Speed condition.
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Figure 10. The fits of remember-know models to Subject C in Experiment 3, where “DP-
ext” represents the extended dual-process model was as. Each panel illustrates the best
and worst fit models for that condition. Circles illustrate the best fits and triangles
illustrate the worst fits. Panel (A) illustrates the fits to high frequency words in Accuracy
condition. Panel (B) illustrates the fits to high frequency words in Speed condition. Panel
(C) illustrates the fits to low frequency words in Accuracy condition and Panel (D)
illustrates the fits to low frequency words in Speed condition.
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Figure 11. The fits of remember-know models to Subject D in Experiment 3, where “one-
dim” represents the one-dimensional SDT model, “one-dim ext” represents the one-
dimensional SDT model with variable remember-know criterion, “DP” represents the
dual-process model and “DP ext” represents the extended dual-process model. Each panel
illustrates the best and worst fit models for that condition. Circles illustrate the best fits
and triangles illustrate the worst fits. Panel (A) illustrates the fits to high frequency words
in Accuracy condition. Panel (B) illustrates the fits to high frequency words in Speed
condition. Panel (C) illustrates the fits to low frequency words in Accuracy condition and
Panel (D) illustrates the fits to low frequency words in Speed condition.
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Figure 12. The fits of remember-know models to Subject B in Experiment 3, where “DP-
ext” represents the extended dual-process model. Each panel illustrates the best and worst
fit models for that condition. Circles illustrate the best fits and triangles illustrate the
worst fits. Panel (A) illustrates the fits to high frequency words in Accuracy condition.
Panel (B) illustrates the fits to high frequency words in Speed condition. Panel (C)
illustrates the fits to low frequency words in Accuracy condition and Panel (D) illustrates
the fits to low frequency words in Speed condition.
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Figure 13. Reaction time distributions for hits followed by “remember” (top row) or
“know” judgments (bottom row) with high frequency words as stimuli, separately for
Accuracy condition (HA, left column) and Speed condition (HS, right column) for
Subject A in Experiment 3. All data are for confidence rating 5. In all panels, the
empirical data are shown as a histogram and the best-fitting ex-Gaussian distribution is
superimposed with a solid contour. Parameters of the ex-Gaussian are shown.
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Figure 14. Reaction time distributions for hits followed by “remember” (top row) or
“know” judgments (bottom row) with low frequency words as stimuli, separately for
Accuracy condition (LA, left column) and Speed condition (LS, right column) for Subject
A in Experiment 3. All data are for confidence rating 5. In all panels, the empirical data
are shown as a histogram and the best-fitting ex-Gaussian distribution is superimposed
with a solid contour. Parameters of the ex-Gaussian are shown.
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